Democratization, Personal Wealth of Politicians and Voting Behavior*

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Abstract:

Between about 1850 and 1920, Western Europe underwent a period of democratization and liberalization, resulting in the expansion of government and the establishment of universal suffrage. This paper examines the impact of politicians' personal wealth on this process, with a focus on the case of the Netherlands, using data from newly-collected probate inventories as a measure of politicians' wealth. The paper finds that the wealth of parliaments decreased significantly over time, and that richer politicians were more likely to vote against fiscal legislation, suggesting that personal wealth negatively influenced the probability of increasing taxes and played a role in determining government size. The analyses presented in the paper support a causal interpretation of these results. However, the study finds no significant relationship between politicians' personal wealth and their voting behavior on suffrage extensions.

JEL Classifications: N14, D72, H71

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1 Introduction

One of the most significant and influential developments in modern history is the rise and gradual expansion of democratic governments in Western Europe. In the early 19th century, most countries were governed by oligarchical elites closely allied with a ruler, typically a king or emperor (Downing, 2020). However, after 1848, most of these nations adopted a parliamentary system with a separation of powers enshrined in a constitution (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004; Persson and Tabellini, 2005; Berman, 2019). Nevertheless, they were not yet parliamentary democracies. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the franchise was gradually extended, but universal suffrage was only granted after 1900 in most countries. In addition to these political changes, European states transformed from minimalist governments that raised taxes solely for military purposes to governments that actively intervened in citizens' lives. Initially, this intervention took the form of investments in public health, transportation, and communication. Subsequently, it expanded to investments in public education and, ultimately, to extensive welfare schemes, including unemployment benefits and pensions (Tilly et al., 1998; Lindert, 2004; Ziblatt, 2006; Dincecco, 2011; Downing, 2020).

This double transition from undemocratic rule to parliamentary democracy and from passive government to welfare state has been widely examined across multiple academic disciplines. Political scientists have identified different mechanisms to explain why incumbent politicians would agree to reforms that reduce their power. These mechanisms include the threat of revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000), electoral expediency (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Aidt et al., 2010), and electoral competition (Llavador and Oxoby, 2005; Galor and Moav, 2006).[1] Subsequent empirical studies have found evidence for each of these mechanisms in specific historical settings (Ziblatt, 2008; Przeworski, 2009; Capoccia, 2010; Dincecco et al., 2011; Dincecco, 2011; Aidt and Jensen, 2014; Aidt and Franck, 2015; Aidt and Jensen, 2017). The studies in this field have primarily focused on politicians' self-interest in safeguarding their political power. However, politicians may also be motivated by a more superficial form of self-interest: their personal wealth (Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Tahoun and Van Lent, 2019).

There are several reasons to suggest that the personal wealth of politicians is a crucial factor in their decision-making. During the early decades of parliamentary regimes, there was very little change in the composition of the political elite, with members of parliament often being extremely wealthy (Magraw, 1986; Piketty, 2013; Machielsen, 2021). In many countries, the nobility remained overrepresented in parliamentary circles for an extended period of time (Bécarud, 1973; Moes, 2012; Linklater, 2013). However, after several decades, parliaments gradually became more diverse, with the first socialists entering parliament and politicians recruited from a broader range of backgrounds than just aristocrats and lawyers (Zévaès, 1908; Van Den Berg, 1983; Busky, 2000; Bevir, 2011). Moreover, Europe faced several negative economic shocks during the tumultuous period surrounding World

[1] An overview of these mechanisms can be found in Przeworski (2009).

War I, which likely reduced the value of politicians' portfolios (Piketty, 2003; Piketty et al., 2006; Piketty and Saez, 2014) and made them considerably poorer. The diversification of parliaments across Europe coincides with the period in which many changes to fiscal legislation and suffrage have been effectuated. Therefore, it is worth exploring whether the changing profile of politicians became the catalyst for the suffrage extensions and fiscal reforms that shaped democratization in the early twentieth century.

This study examines the case of the Netherlands to explore whether changes in the profile of politicians played a role in the country's transition to democracy and the implementation of fiscal reforms. The Netherlands serves as an emblematic case in the study of European democratization, having transitioned to a constitutional monarchy in 1848. Subsequently, it implemented universal male suffrage on 12 December 1917, and achieved full universal suffrage on 9 May 1919, following World War I. The introduction of the income tax occurred in 1893, with substantial changes made during World War I due to the pressures on the country as a neutral party (Vrankrijker, 1967; Smit, 2002). The political system of the Netherlands during the transition period shared many characteristics with other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany (Prussia), and Sweden, including a bicameral system, district elections, and a gradually diversifying parliament. Initially, suffrage was based on taxes paid, with later requirements relaxed. The country also experienced explicit religious tensions similar to those in Belgium and Austria. In the context of the Netherlands' relatively loose party discipline and chaotic parliament, there was ample variation in voting behavior, and politicians likely voted as if their vote was pivotal, making it difficult to predict whether a proposed law would be accepted or not.

I use the Netherlands as a case study to examine politicians' voting behavior on suffrage extensions and tax hikes between 1872-1921. The aim is to explore whether politicians' personal wealth has a negative influence on the likelihood of them voting in favor of several historically important reforms. To achieve this, newly-collected probate inventories from various archival sources are used to estimate the net wealth of politicians at the time of voting. I then analyze the relationship between personal wealth and voting outcomes, while controlling for personal and district-level characteristics. It is hypothesized that personal wealth may influence politicians' voting behavior because reforms can have a significant impact on their future cash flows. This hypothesis is supported by present-day evidence suggesting that politicians' self-interest can affect their decision-making (Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Fisman et al., 2014; Tahoun and Van Lent, 2019). To arrive at a more causal interpretation of the estimates, instrumental variable (IV) estimates of personal wealth on the propensity to vote for reforms are provided, relying on arguably exogenous variation in whether the politician's father was also politically active.

My findings indicate that personal wealth has a significant negative influence on politicians' likelihood to vote in favor of fiscal legislation. Notably, this holds after controlling for political party affiliation. Fiscal legislation has a nontrivial impact on politicians' personal wealth, and the potential impact of acceptance on their personal wealth is strong enough for politicians to deviate from the party line. These results indicate that, despite apparent

ideological and partisan influences (Lijphart, 1975; De Jong, 2001; Van Den Berg and Vis, 2013; De Rooy, 2014), politicians still pursue their personal financial interests in parliament. The counterfactual scenario implies that, had the parliament been less affluent in preceding eras, it would have been inclined to accept tax hikes that were presently rejected. Additionally, tax hikes that were endorsed by a parliament would have likely been dismissed by an earlier, more prosperous parliament. The findings of this study have important implications for the political economy and development literature. The study indicates that the personal wealth and profile of politicians play a crucial role in determining the level of taxation. Therefore, when modeling policy outcomes, politicians' personal interests should be considered, in addition to electoral and other factors. This finding is consistent with previous research on political economics, including Persson et al. (2000); Besley and Persson (2014); Kleven et al. (2016); Corvalan et al. (2016). The study also corroborates that politicians act opportunistically (Djankov et al., 2010).

The findings also suggest that personal wealth has a weak impact on voting behavior in suffrage extensions. This outcome is in line with the notion that suffrage extensions have little direct and predictable effect on politicians' wealth, although it is possible that politicians lack the foresight to consider the consequences of franchise extensions. This result supports the conclusions of Dutch political historians who view the path to universal suffrage as heavily influenced by compromise and ideology (Van Welderen Rengers and Romeijn, 1916; Lijphart, 1975; De Haan, 2003; De Rooy, 2014). From an international perspective, this finding is in line with models that describe suffrage extensions as a form of intra-elite bargaining or enfranchised-disenfranchised dynamics, without taking into account politicians' personal interests. This analysis also provides little support for the notion that revolutionary threats or peaceful agitation are significant factors in the decision to extend the franchise. (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu, 2008; Aidt and Franck, 2019).

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I provide an overview of the historical context surrounding franchise extension (2.1) and fiscal reforms (2.2). I also make plausible that the acceptance of fiscal laws have financial consequences for politicians themselves. In Section 2.3, I illustrate that these laws and votes coincide with the changing nature of the Dutch parliament over time in terms of composition and wealth levels. In Section 3, I provide a closer look at the data sources, and illustrate my methodological approach. In Section 4, my analyses involve a dual analysis of the influence of personal wealth separately on suffrage extensions and fiscal reforms. Descriptive statistics for the analyses on these two sets of laws are reported in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 shows the OLS and IV estimates, focusing on suffrage extensions and fiscal reforms separately. I close the analysis by providing an interpretation of the results for fiscal development and democratization. Finally, in Section 5, I conclude. Supplementary materials are available in an Online Appendix. In Appendix A, I provide a more detailed historical background. Appendix B presents a short framework to fix ideas about the relationship between wealth and voting behavior. I report

a wide range of robustness checks in Appendix C. Appendix D is a data appendix.[2]

2 Transformation from Oligarchy to Democracy

2.1 The Road to Universal Suffrage

Prior to 1848, Dutch government institutions were centralized around the King, who wielded the majority of power and was surrounded by technocrats and loyalists. However, the revolutions that swept across Europe in 1848 left the King apprehensive, leading him to request that a leading liberal politician draft a new constitution, signaling the end of the absolute monarchy and ushering in a more liberal and democratic era. Beginning in 1848, parliamentary control was instituted over government formation and legislative power. Parliament consisted of a lower house, which was a representative body charged with representing electorates based on a district system, and an upper house, which focused on legal coherence and served as a buffer against demagoguery and hasty policy-making (De Jong, 1999). During this period, the relationship between parliament and executive government was still being established, and norms were still in the process of being developed.[3]

The political struggle persisted beyond 1848, as the adoption of the new constitution marked a turning point that was expected to set the country on a path towards expanding suffrage, possibly even to the point of universal suffrage (Van Der Kolk et al., 2018). There are various reasons why suffrage extension was almost constantly on the political agenda throughout the period of this study. Firstly, there were persistent differences in the principles held by political factions. For Liberals, individual-based suffrage was a way to obtain adequate representatives in the Lower House, whereas Christian political parties focused on the role of the family as a unit in need of political representation (Van Den Berg and Vis, 2013; Van Der Kolk et al., 2018). In addition, electoral expedience may have played a large role: at times, it was widely expected that Protestant parties were set to gain electorally from the extension of the franchise (Jong, 2017; Aidt and Franck, 2019), which made them more favorable to it. Thirdly, a major driver playing a role in (delaying) suffrage extension was the fear of upheaval and revolution: many members of parliament feared the effects on an electorate consisting of residents who lacked sufficient independence and political development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Van Der Kolk et al., 2018). For other politicians, however, extension of the franchise was a way to pacify more radical societal tendencies (Van Der Kolk et al., 2018). Additionally, the issue of suffrage extension was complicated by the fact that it was intertwined with fiscal reform, as discussed in Section 2.2. Finally, the advent of economic development precipitated a secular and rapid surge in urbanization, literacy rates, and educational attainment across the population. Consequently, this tran-

[2]Appendix D contains instructions pertaining to the replication package, also available on the Harvard Dataverse and GitHub.

[3]For instance, it was only in the 1870s that it became customary for governments to resign following general elections (Van Den Berg and Vis, 2013).

sition gradually swayed the consensus in favor of suffrage extension, leading discussions to focus on delineating precise eligibility criteria—such as tax status, property ownership, or professional engagement—and determining the degree of stringency with which such criteria should be enforced (De Jong, 2001; De Rooy, 2014; Van Der Kolk et al., 2018).[4]

There were multiple legislative initiatives and efforts to expand the franchise throughout the period of interest. Some attempts focused on revising the constitution, with the first attempt occurring in 1872 through the proposal to lower census requirements to achieve suffrage expansion, which ultimately failed to pass. The second systematic attempt did not occur until 1887. Upon its eventual adoption, the 1887 reforms increased the electorate from about 15% to 25% of the male population, and fixed the number of parliamentary seats, with 100 members in the lower house and 50 in the upper house (De Jong, 1999). Furthermore, the suffrage criteria were augmented by several additional factors, including the vague notions of "fitness" and "social standing" (Van Der Kolk et al., 2018). Thirdly, in 1892, Minister Johannes Tak van Poortvliet proposed a plan to address the vagueness of suffrage criteria by amending the electoral law (*Kieswet*). His plans were widely perceived as radical, by enfranchising all men who could read or write and inhabited a living space, potentially enfranchising approximately 800,000 male inhabitants compared to the estimated 300,000 *ex ante* (Van Der Kolk et al., 2018). The project law was debated in parliament and an unacceptable amendment was accepted, leading the minister to withdraw his plan. However, after new elections, similar plans proposed by the new Minister of Internal Affairs Samuel Van Houten in 1896 proved to be more successful. These proposals introduced two categories for suffrage eligibility: meeting a census through paying direct taxation and a miscellaneous category known as "declaration," which included paying rent, passing certain exams, or having savings or a pension. These flexible requirements allowed an increasing number of inhabitants to meet the criteria for enfranchisement (Van Der Kolk et al., 2018).In the 1897 elections, approximately 575,000 men were able to vote, a number that increased to almost 1 million men in 1913, representing close to 50% of the male population. In 1917, a compromise was reached between confessional and liberal politicians, who traded off universal male suffrage (a demand of the liberals) and a constitutional foundation for public funding of religiously-based schools (a demand of confessional politicians) (Lijphart, 2008). The following year, women were also enfranchised without significant controversy.

2.2 Changing Fiscal Paradigms

Following the constitutional reforms of 1848, the fiscal system of the Netherlands retained many of its protectionist regulations from the 17th and 18th centuries, resulting in obstruction of almost all product markets (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004). However, beginning in the 1850s, the Dutch government initiated liberalization and harmonization efforts across economic and institutional domains (Knippenberg et al., 2000). The government slowly liberalized trade by relying less on excise duties and toll payments and more on taxes on

[4]Appendix A.1 features a more extensive historical background of the drivers of suffrage extension.

wealth and income. Despite these efforts, government size remained limited (Bos, 2006). By the 1870s, the ideological paradigm of *laissez-faire* began to weaken, prompting politicians, particularly liberals, opinion leaders, and public intellectuals to support more government intervention. The 1854 Poor Laws and the 1874 law regulating child labor in the Netherlands were early indications of this trend. Ever since, fiscal reform was almost constantly on the political agenda, made urgent by three intertwined drivers in particular: rising poverty and inequality led to social unrest and a perceived threat of socialism (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Smit, 2002; Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004). Secondly, the taxation system in place was widely considered inefficient, and raising fiscal revenues was difficult in the context of the inefficient taxation system in place. Thirdly, a secular decline in colonial revenues accentuated the need for fiscal reform.[5]

During the period of interest, two pieces of fiscal legislation underwent significant reform and revision: the income tax (*Inkomstenbelasting*) and the inheritance tax (*Successiewet*). The income tax was established in 1893, in response to mounting pressure on the government to reform the existing tax system, which primarily relied on taxes on real estate, consumer goods, and entrepreneurship, while shares and other financial assets were largely exempt from taxation (Vrankrijker 1967; Smit 2002). However, changing the fiscal system proved to be a formidable challenge, as it was closely intertwined with the issue of suffrage, which was granted only to those who paid sufficient taxes. Consequently, any changes to the fiscal system had to consider how they would affect suffrage. This proved to be particularly difficult in the 1870s and 1880s, when various attempts at reform failed to gain traction.

Preceding the 1893 reform were various failed attempts. In 1863, the finance minister, Gerardus Betz, attempted to reform the existing patent tax by replacing it with a universal income tax, while also abolishing several excises. However, his plan was rejected by the lower house due to doubts about compliance and a lack of perceived urgency (Smit, 2002). In 1872, finance minister Pieter Blussé made a similar attempt, but it was also rejected due to the inability to unite different factions of parliament. Some believed it was too radical, while others thought it was too modest. In 1884, finance minister Willem Grobbée faced criticism for his proposal to increase excise duties and introduce a "class tax" with progressive tax rates on income. However, he ultimately failed to implement either of these measures (Van Den Berg and Vis, 2013). After 1887, the year in which constitutional reforms separated the issue of fiscal reform from the question of suffrage expansion by incorporating additional criteria for suffrage. This effectively paved the way for the eventual acceptance of an income tax. The designer of the 1893 income tax reform, Nicolaas Pierson, introduced it in two parts. The first part entailed taxing (fictitious) income from wealth, and the second part taxed income from trade and profession (Fritschy, 1997). However, the income tax was still limited in its scope: the highest tariff (for the wealthiest individuals) amounted to a liability of only 3.2% of annual income. The revenue from the new taxation accounted for approximately

[5]In Appendix A.2, I provide a more extensive historical background describing the pressures for change that caused the issue of fiscal reform to be on the political agenda throughout the focus period of this study.

10% of government income in the initial years after its introduction (Bos, 2006). The income tax remained unchanged for almost twenty years after its introduction. However, during World War I, the neutral Dutch government faced growing financial difficulties. Against this backdrop, the finance minister at the time, Willem Treub, was able to secure approval for a proposal that increased the progressivity of the income tax system. Specifically, this involved raising the tax rates for higher taxable incomes and merging the two previously separate categories, resulting in a higher tax rate being applied to the total taxable income (Slijkerman, 2016). This information is summarized in the left Panel of Figure 1, depicting the income tax rate as a function of time and income.[6]

The other main pillar of the Dutch fiscal system was the inheritance tax (*Successiewet*). In place since 1817, this tax underwent three modifications after a 1877 amendment made bequeathing to lineal descendants liable for taxation (Jacobs, 2003). Under the 1877 amendment, inheritances with a net worth below 1,000 guilders (about four times the annual wage of a worker) were exempt from taxation. The rates for direct descendants were set at 1% of net wealth. Rates for non-direct family members or unrelated individuals were slightly higher. The *Successiewet* was subsequently modified three times, all of which were motivated with the need to raise additional taxes urgently. In all cases, tariffs for lineal descendants were gradually increased, but in some cases, certain other tariffs were reduced as compensation. The first tariff increase occurred in 1911, which included a sharp rise in rates for lineal descendants (Jacobs, 2003). The 1916 amendment further increased the rates: tariffs for direct descendants now ranged from 2% for inheritances with the lowest net wealth (but above the 1,000 guilders threshold) to 6% for inheritances over 500,000 guilders. Finally, in 1921, due to the dire state of government finances, rates were substantially increased. The minimum tariff was set at 3.5%, even for inheritances worth less than 1,000 guilders, and for direct descendants, could increase up to 8% for inheritances worth over 500,000 guilders. This information is summarized in the right Panel of Figure 1, which depicts the tax rate on inheritances as a function of time and the value of the bequest.

[Figure 1 here]

Abstracting from the possibility that politicians might benefit from taxation in terms of public goods, they are personally confronted with direct costs when fiscal legislation is passed. With certain assumptions, the financial implications of accepting these laws can be readily calculated. To illustrate, using the rates of the 1893 income tax and the 1911 succession law, an estimate of the present value of accepting the law, using $r = 0.03$ and $T = 20$ (the average age at the time of voting was 53, and the average age of death of a politician was 73), I find that the expected present value cost of the acceptance of the 1893 income tax for a politician who earned about 5,000 guilders per year was about 8,000 guilders, and the expected costs of the acceptance of the inheritance tax reforms for a politician with median

[6]These levels roughly correspond to relatively poor, median, and relatively rich politicians. The same applies to the right Panel.

wealth at death (150,000 guilders) was about 2,500 guilders. These amounts are not trivial: they amount to four times a politician's yearly formal income for the income tax, and one time a politician's formal yearly income for the initial inheritance tax.[7]

2.3 Transformation in Parliament

From the 1848 reforms until the 1880s, the composition of parliament remained relatively static. There were only two clear political factions: liberals and confessional politicians (Van Den Berg, 1983; De Jong, 2001). The confessional politicians were made up of Protestants and Catholics, who formed a coalition to counterbalance liberalism. The liberals generally had the upper hand in parliament during this period. In the 1880s, electoral outcomes became more volatile, leading to diversification within parliament. This was marked by the entry of the first socialists in the lower house in the early 1890s, and the dominance of men with backgrounds in law or theology began to unfold. Within the confessional factions, the most prominent leaders for the Catholics and Protestants were Herman Schaepman and Abraham Kuyper, respectively, who were both of humble origins (Koch, 2020). Additionally, the role of the nobility declined (Moes, 2012). Furthermore, the influence of networks also diminished, as fewer politicians had backgrounds in law or politics: in the 1870's, about 50% of confessional politicians and 35% of liberal politicians' fathers had a background in law or politics, in 1911, this was the case for only 17% of confessional and 33% of liberal politicians. As a result, more men with diverse backgrounds entered the Lower House, leading to an overall increase in diversity within parliament.

One changing aspect that has not yet been explored is the personal wealth of members of parliament over time. Figure 2 shows aspects of the wealth distribution of consecutive parliaments over time.[8] I focus on median wealth, as the mean is heavily skewed towards the upper quantiles. The trend in median wealth aligns closely with the above-described parliamentary diversification. Specifically, whereas there is no clear trend in median wealth before 1888, the median wealth of parliament steadily declines after 1897, the year after which a far-reaching suffrage extension was accepted. To illustrate, the median lower house member standing from 1871-1875 dies with an estate value of about 80,000, whereas the estate value of the median lower house member is only about 20,000 guilders in the 1918-1922 parliament. Throughout the period of reforms, median parliamentary wealth has declined with a factor of 4.

[Figure 2 here]

Focusing on the upper tail of the distribution (the 75th percentile), I observe that their net worth fluctuates widely throughout the period, and only decreases after 1900, implying that the wealthiest politicians in the lower house still died with an extremely high net worth.

[7] In Appendix A.2, I further substantiate that politicians could likely make this sort of trade-off.
[8] The distribution is for wealth at the inception of parliament and deflated to 1900 guilders.

Interestingly, the bulk of fiscal legislation, such as inheritance tax tariff hikes in 1911, 1916, and 1921, as well as income tax reform in 1914, was implemented during this period of decreasing net worth for the wealthiest politicians. Meanwhile, suffrage extensions were granted by both relatively richer and relatively poorer parliaments. For instance, a wealthy parliament rejected the 1872 income tax proposal, while relatively poor parliaments accepted the 1893 and 1914 income taxes. In summary, there appears to be a correlation between parliamentary wealth and the acceptance of significant reforms, particularly in the case of fiscal legislation.

3 Methodology

3.1 Empirical Model

To find out whether personal wealth plays a role in politicians' decision-making, I collect voting outcomes on the suffrage extensions and fiscal legislation. I use newly-collected probate inventories to obtain a measure of politicians personal wealth at the time of death.[9] The archival source, the *Memories van Successie* are publicly accessible probate inventories used by the tax administration to levy inheritance tax, and are available for my purposes from 1877 to 1927.[10] Furthermore, I capture a politician's ideology by a classification on the basis of several works by political historians (Van Den Berg, 1983; Secker, 1991; Van Den Braak, 1999; Turpijn, 2017; Oomen, 2020), authors of detailed collective biographical works of Dutch politicians. The classification comes from a dataset by the *Parlementair Documentatie Centrum* (Parliamentary Documentation Center), assembled on the basis of aforementioned works and under the supervision of the aforementioned authors, and is primarily based on close reading of parliamentary debates, secondary works, and biographical information. I map this heterogeneous classification to four basic ideological currents: Liberal, Catholic, Protestant, and Socialist.

In previous empirical studies of voting behavior (Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Peltzman, 1984, 1985; Levitt, 1996; Mian et al., 2010), separating ideology from personal and constituent interests has proven difficult because ideological interests and constituent interests were (nearly) perfectly correlated, e.g. wealthier and more religious politicians represent districts in which religious shares are higher. In this study, however, I exploit many votes, with many different district-politician combinations, so that there is sufficient variation to separately identify the effects of constituencies, ideology, and personal wealth.

The baseline model involves analyzing the two sets of laws $k \in K = \{$ Suffrage Extensions, Fiscal Legislation$\}$, and then pooling the voting decisions on all laws within k. Indexing the

[9] In the past, researchers have considered indirect proxies of self-interest, such as ideology (Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Peltzman, 1985) or personal shareholdings (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Tahoun and Van Lent, 2019). This study arguably uses the most obvious proxy for self-interest, i.e. personal wealth.

[10] I explain the data source in detail, and give an example, in Appendix D.2. I analyse selection bias in finding these inventories in Table B.1.

vote by politician i on a particular law $j \in k$ as p_{ij}, I model $V_{ij} = \Pr(p_{ij} = 1)$ as a function of a politician's wealth and party, augmented by law fixed-effects and other controls Z:

$$V_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{ihs Wealth}_{ij} + \delta \cdot \text{Party}_i + \gamma \cdot \text{Law}_j + Z_{ij}\eta + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{1}$$

My baseline specification involves a relationship that is linear in the inverse hyperbolic sine of Wealth.[11] I follow e.g. Mian et al. (2010); Nunn and Qian (2014); Aidt and Franck (2015) in estimating a linear probability model, as it is more straightforward to estimate and interpret a model with indicator variables, it is straightforward to interpret eventual interaction effects (as in Mian et al., 2010, but see also Greene (2010)), it allows for robust standard errors (Wooldridge, 2010), it easily incorporates law and party fixed effects, and it accommodates IV analysis more easily. Furthermore, the estimator given by the linear probability model remains a consistent estimator if the conditional expectation is correctly specified, unlike the logit and probit models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).

I expect β_1 to be negative in the case of fiscal legislation. A negative relationship between personal wealth and voting behavior on these laws implies that the the utility costs to acceptance are increasing in personal wealth. In the case of suffrage extensions, this is less clear. In Appendix B, I provide a theoretical framework rationalizing the potential relationship between personal wealth and voting behavior in more detail.

3.2 Individual and Constituency Characteristics

In addition to personal financial interests and party affiliations, politicians consider other factors when deciding their vote. According to various theories (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986), politicians factor in constituent interests. To measure the economic interests of a particular district, I use the percentage of the total labor force employed in industry, services, and agriculture in the year closest to the vote. As documented in historical literature, there were significant regional differences in the distribution of industry, with it being concentrated in certain areas (Knippenberg et al., 2000). Another variable I include is the proportion of wealth tax-paying individuals, which serves as a proxy for local economic activity. Inequality at the regional or district level is likely to have been high, as landed aristocrats were concentrated in several provinces and constituencies (Moes, 2012). As a second proxy of district-level economic activity, I also include the percentage of inhabitants paying income tax.[12] Additionally, I consider the religious composition of a district by including the percentage of Dutch *Hervormd* or Roman Catholic inhabitants in some specifications. In the Dutch context, religion has been a dominant factor in political life, as evidenced by the pillarization system (Lijphart, 2008).

[11] Bellemare and Wichman (2020) provide an overview of the properties of the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. In my case, the interpretation coincides with an elasticity of voting behavior w.r.t. personal wealth, when the propensity to vote in favor would be close to one.

[12] The wealth tax exists at every point in time in my analysis. The income tax, however, was established in 1893. The data I use before 1893 reflect its predecessor, the patent tax.

Some argue that the effectiveness of politicians' interests might vary based on the level of electoral competition (Duggan and Martinelli, 2017). To control for potential effects of political competition, I include various electoral variables such as turnout, the vote share and the vote share of nearest competitor, along with several demographic variables such as a politician's birth year, Lower House tenure, and a politician's electoral horizon proxied by the days since the last election. Other theories suggest that politicians may be motivated to vote in response to threats of instability or revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Aidt et al., 2010). To capture revolutionary threat, I include a socialist dummy variable indicating whether the politician competed against a socialist, as well as the voting share obtained by socialist candidates.[13] Moreover, the incentives for politicians to accommodate a revolutionary threat might also lead to less radical threats being effective (Aidt and Franck, 2019). To capture peaceful agitation, I include a count of strikes in the year preceding the vote in a politician's district (see e.g. Van Der Velden, 2009). I give a more detailed overview of the control variables and the primary sources used in Appendix D.3. In Table 1, I summarize all variables and sources used in this study.

[Table 1 here]

3.3 Controlling for Differences in Portfolio Composition

I use probate inventories to measure the wealth of politicians. These inventories provide information on the assets and wealth of politicians at the time of their death. However, the wealth at the time of death may not accurately reflect a politician's wealth at the time of voting. To address this concern, I use return rates to adjust for differential returns across asset classes and control for the potential distorting effects of portfolio composition on wealth. Specifically, I rely on data on asset class returns from Jordà et al. (2019) to estimate a politician's wealth at the time of voting, which corrects for any differential asset returns they may have experienced over their lifetime. Failing to make this adjustment could lead to an overstatement of differences in wealth between politicians and potentially overestimate the impact of personal wealth on voting behavior. This procedure also enables a comparison of the wealth levels of politicians who died at different ages. To achieve this, I first deflate all observed wealth to 1900 guilders, then use a recursive relationship to identify a politician's wealth at the time of voting on law k as a function of their (deflated) wealth at death:

$$\text{Wealth}_{i,t+1} = \sum_{J} \text{AssetShare}_{i,j,t} \cdot \text{AssetReturn}_{i,j,[t,t+1]} \tag{2}$$

This method used to estimate a politician's wealth at the time of voting involves leveraging their observed wealth and asset composition at the time of death to calculate an estimate of their wealth one year before, based on real returns on a given asset class. This recursive

[13] The potential for revolutionary threat was seen during the 1918 attempt at revolution by leading socialist politician Pieter Troelstra (Wijne, 1999).

process ultimately yields an estimate of wealth at the time of voting. However, the available portfolio decomposition only distinguishes between Dutch and non-Dutch assets, necessitating the use of weights to estimate returns on foreign portfolios. Based on findings from Gelderblom et al. (2022), I assign weights of 20% to German returns, 20% to French returns, 10% to Belgian returns, 10% to US returns, 10% to British returns, 10% to Italian returns, and 20% equally-weighted to all other countries, representing a 2% weight per country.[14]

3.4 Mismeasurement and Endogeneity

Even after accounting for differential wealth returns, it is possible that politicians' wealth could be mismeasured, as specific voting behavior may be rewarded by interest groups (Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Fisman et al., 2014; Tahoun and Van Lent, 2019). More generally, both wealth and voting behavior could be simultaneously determined, and there might be other sources of unobserved heterogeneity responsible for the observed correlation between wealth and voting behavior. To remove any remaining endogeneity from the estimates, I confine myself to using exogenous variation that is correlated with personal wealth but uncorrelated with a politician's ideology and other individual-specific heterogeneity. To accomplish this, biographical information of politicians' parents is collected, primarily from the *Biographical Dictionary of the Netherlands* and genealogy websites. From this information, I construct an instrument called *Father Politician*, indicating whether the father of politician i was a politician at any level or not.[15] This leads to the following first stage regression of the endogenous variable, personal wealth, on the instrument:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Personal Wealth}_{ij} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 \cdot \text{Father Politician}_i + \\ \delta \cdot \text{Party}_i + \gamma \cdot \text{Law}_j + Z_{ij}\eta + \mu_{ij}\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Politicians whose fathers were active in politics tend to be wealthier than those whose fathers were not, and especially after controlling for political party affiliation, it is unlikely that having a father in politics influences politicians' voting behavior. The relevance of this instrument lies in the fact that politicians whose fathers were ever active in politics tend to be wealthier than those whose fathers were not. The validity of this instrument implies that there is no direct effect of being a member of a political family on voting behavior, given political party affiliation and other controls.[16]

[14] This method is based on asset shares evolving endogeneously as a function of realized returns. I also construct a measure of estimated wealth taking portfolio shares as fixed, with yearly rebalancing of the portfolio, such that the asset composition is constant over time, which I employ in robustness checks in Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3. The results are insensitive to this assumption.

[15] Another instrument that I have at my disposal is based on the wealth of politicians' parents: Inheritance. This is a possible instrument, but it is less strongly associated with Personal Wealth than Father Politician.

[16] Researchers have utilized similar instruments to account for the endogeneity of personal wealth. For instance, Meer et al. (2003) used inheritances as an instrument for wealth, Tahoun and Van Lent (2019) used returns from a retirement plan, and Hilber and Liu (2008) used parental occupation, education level,

Potential threats to identification exist when the instrument may itself be endogenous. For example, a father who was a politician might have influenced the views on redistribution that a person holds independently of wealth. While it remains unlikely that this directly impacts their voting behavior after controlling for political party and other observables, I address this concern by employing a placebo test. I gather data on a new set of laws that pertain to government intervention, specifically those that regulate markets. These laws provide a direct relation to politicians' beliefs. If the proposed instrument indeed serves as a proxy for such beliefs rather than reflecting wealth, the OLS and IV analyses should also yield results in this case. The results are reported in Appendix Table B.4, and show no evidence of these factors playing a role.

4 Analysis

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents an overview of the laws under scrutiny and the voting patterns of politicians concerning these laws. These legislative measures were characterized by a substantial level of participation in parliamentary voting. The Table shows information about the outcome of each law, indicating whether it garnered majority approval or was rejected in the lower house of parliament.[17] The Table underscores that many laws encountered opposition, and party or ideological affiliation did not exclusively determine voting behavior. Notably, confessional politicians, comprising Protestant and Catholic coalitions, exhibited a high degree of dissent.

The Table is consistent with observations of political historians. Concerning suffrage extension, within the Catholic and Protestant factions, politicians did not uniformly support or oppose the proposals (Van Den Berg and Vis, 2013; Van Der Kolk et al., 2018). Both groups harbored factions that were largely in favor, particularly those led by Protestant politician Abraham Kuyper and Catholic politician Herman Schaepman, but there were also factions that leaned toward opposition. Regarding fiscal legislation, Smit (2002) has documented that opposition was primarily concentrated within the confessional block, although the presented Table indicates significant dissent within the liberal faction as well. Broadly speaking, liberals appear to have exhibited more party discipline in comparison to confessional politicians, although there were instances when dissent was even higher among liberals. This was exemplified by the 1872 income tax proposal, which resulted in an even split among liberals.

[Table 2]

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics pertaining to the variables used in the empirical analysis. The data indicate that during the voting process on fiscal legislation, confessional

and income.

[17] Certain laws, such as the propositions for suffrage extensions in 1872 and 1892, as well as the proposition for an income tax in 1872, were met with rejection. However, all other laws were accepted, albeit not without dissenting voices.

politicians held a significant presence in parliament, occupying an average of 44% of the parliamentary seats. Conversely, when suffrage extensions were being voted upon, liberals enjoyed a slight majority, comprising an average of 48% of the parliamentary seats. Considering the liberals' propensity to vote in favor of these laws, it is probable that the dissent exhibited by confessional politicians played a crucial role in determining the voting outcomes. Furthermore, the dissenting votes of liberals may have also held significance, particularly in light of the disunity among confessional politicians.

Moreover, politicians represent districts that exhibit considerable variation. Panels B to E present descriptive statistics for several control variables at different levels. Panel B offers information on party affiliation, Panel C highlights various district characteristics, Panel D focuses on variables related to electoral characteristics, and Panel E presents variables used in IV estimations. For instance, Panel C showcases the professional composition of districts, revealing that, on average, approximately 18% of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, with a standard deviation of 12%. The religious composition of districts adheres to expected patterns, with districts being predominantly Protestant on average, albeit with a significant Catholic minority. In districts where Catholics formed the majority, they constituted a substantial majority (Knippenberg et al., 2000). Additionally, electoral competition varied across districts, as evidenced in Panel D, where politicians garnered an average of 51% and 55% of the vote in their respective last elections. In the elections preceding suffrage extensions, there were few candidates competing against socialist candidates. Moving to Panel E, concerning fiscal legislation, information regarding the professions of politicians' fathers was available for 346 out of a total of 548 politician-vote combinations, while for suffrage extensions, data was obtained for 279 observations.

The current analysis centers on the personal wealth of politicians. When it came to suffrage extension voting, the median wealth of politicians stood at around 67,000 deflated guilders, with a higher mean of approximately 200,000 guilders.[18] However, during the voting on fiscal legislation, politicians were slightly less wealthy, although the notable standard deviation indicates significant variation among politicians. The estimated wealth at the time of the vote does not exhibit substantial differences based on the method employed to infer it.[19]

[Table 3]

4.2 OLS and IV Results

Table 4 presents estimates of the impact of personal wealth on voting behavior concerning suffrage extensions. Model 1, which presents OLS estimates, includes only party and law dummies alongside the independent variable of interest (personal wealth at the time of the

[18]GDP per capita in 1880 was roughly 1,700 guilders, average wealth about 12,000 guilders and median wealth likely 0 (Toussaint et al., 2022).

[19]Both the constant shares method and the rebalancing method yield comparable results in terms of the distribution.

vote). This model reveals that party dummies and the independent variable collectively explain 33% of the variance in voting behavior regarding suffrage extensions. This finding is consistent with observations in Section 4.1, which highlight considerable latitude in voting behavior. This characteristic aligns with the characterization of the late nineteenth-century Dutch political system as one not significantly constrained by intense electoral or party pressures.

To account for the residual variance in voting behavior, Model 2 examines the role of politicians' personal wealth in conjunction with a comprehensive set of control variables. This model provides initial estimates of the effect of personal wealth, incorporating these controls. The coefficient remains significant at the 10% level; however, the point estimate is modest. Specifically, a 1% increase in personal wealth is associated with a 0.01 percentage point reduction in the probability of voting for suffrage extension (Bellemare and Wichman, 2020).

[Table 4]

Many of the key control variables do not exhibit a clear relationship with the dependent variable. For instance, considering the economic characteristics of districts, those with a higher proportion of industrial and service sectors do not show a greater inclination to support suffrage reforms; although the coefficient signs are positive, the effects are not statistically significant. Furthermore, no clear relationship emerges between the religious affiliation or other demographic and economic characteristics of the electorate and the voting behavior of their representatives. Indicators for Catholic and *Hervormd* Protestant shares do not consistently correlate with a propensity to vote for reforms. In this model, as in Table 5, the reference category is Reformed Protestant Christians, a smaller religious minority.

Exceptions in Model 2 include a positive coefficient for Vote Share Nearest Competitor, indicating that politicians who won by narrower margins were significantly more inclined to vote for reforms. This suggests that political competition may be a motivating factor for reforms (Acemoglu, 2008; Aidt and Franck, 2019). Nevertheless, other factors related to political competition, such as the number of strikes in a politician's district during the preceding year, show no clear positive association with the propensity to vote for reforms. The significant coefficient for Seniority indicates that politicians with longer tenure in the Lower House exhibit a decreased propensity to support suffrage extension. Conversely, the positive coefficient for Days since Last Election implies that representatives nearer the end of their term are more likely to vote in favor. In any event, the estimated coefficients for the control variables represent associations that may stem from various underlying factors. In summary, conditional on law and party fixed effects, most control variables appear to have minimal explanatory power for the variation in voting behavior. This conclusion is further supported by the selection ratio statistic (Oster, 2019), which suggests that the estimates are unlikely to be substantially distorted by omitted variable bias.

Despite initial evidence suggesting the relevance of personal interests in suffrage extensions, an OLS approach may not fully isolate the effect of personal wealth on voting behavior

due to several potential limitations. To address potential biases arising from threats to identification, an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach is adopted. An indicator variable for whether a politician's father was politically active is employed as the instrument.

Models 3 and 4 in Table 4 present these IV results. The first-stage results reveal a significant association between the *Father Politician* instrument and Politicians' Wealth. Despite the limited sample size, the first-stage Wald statistic is high in both models, and the coefficient on the instrument in the first stage (β_{FS}) is highly significant.[20] Turning to the main results, Model 3 presents the IV estimates without control variables. The coefficient for Personal Wealth is negative but statistically insignificant, and its magnitude is close to that of the OLS estimates, despite the relatively strong first-stage Wald statistic. Model 4 reports the IV results conditional on the full set of controls. The point estimate increases in magnitude but remains statistically insignificant. The standard error is large, notwithstanding the significant association between the instrument and the endogenous variable. As in the OLS models, only a few control variables show significant correlations with the voting propensity.

Collectively, the estimates in Table 4 indicate a negative association between Personal Wealth and the propensity to vote for suffrage extensions; however, the IV analysis yields no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the two.

[Table 5 here]

In Table 5, the results for the analysis of fiscal legislation are presented. The first two models provide estimates conditional on law and party fixed effects (Model 1) and, additionally, on the full set of control variables (Model 2). In both models, the point estimate for Personal Wealth is negative and statistically significant. Surprisingly, in the OLS analyses, conditional on party and law fixed effects, the point estimates for Personal Wealth in the fiscal legislation analysis are very similar to those for suffrage extensions in Table 4. Again, only a few control variables show significant correlations with the propensity to vote for fiscal legislation. The coefficient for Total Personal Taxes is positive, indicating that representatives from districts with higher economic activity are more inclined to support these reforms. Conversely, the coefficient for Strikes is slightly negative, suggesting that representatives from districts experiencing more strikes are less inclined to vote for the reforms. The coefficient for Days Since Last Election is negative, suggesting a decreased propensity to support fiscal legislation as politicians approach the end of their term.

Models 3 and 4 present the IV results. The first-stage analysis reveals that the Father Politician instrument has a significant association with Personal Wealth, similar to the suffrage extension analysis. In this context, the first-stage Wald statistic is high, and the associated p-value is less than 0.01 in all models, indicating that the instrument is likely sufficiently strong (Stock et al., 2002). The first-stage coefficient of the instrument is comparable in magnitude and statistical significance to that in the suffrage extension analysis.

[20] Complete reduced-form and first-stage estimates are reported in Appendix Tables B.5 and B.6.

In the second stage, however, a divergence emerges between the results for fiscal legislation and suffrage extensions. The coefficient for Personal Wealth increases in magnitude and is highly statistically significant, both conditional on only law and party fixed effects (Model 3) and when including additional controls (Model 4). In Model 4, the coefficient estimate for personal wealth implies that a 10% increase in a politician's personal wealth is associated with a 0.57 percentage point decrease in their probability of voting for fiscal legislation. This effect size is substantial. A more detailed interpretation of these findings is provided in Section 4.3.

In summary, for suffrage extensions, although the point estimate for personal wealth is consistently negative, the standard errors are considerably larger, resulting in statistically insignificant coefficients. The effect sizes of these estimates are also modest. Conversely, for fiscal legislation, the coefficients are highly significant and consistent with theoretical expectations. These findings indicate stable coefficient signs across various models, and the coefficient remains highly significant in the full IV specification, despite the relatively small sample size. Collectively, this evidence suggests that politicians' personal wealth influences their voting behavior on fiscal legislation, whereas no such influence is evident for suffrage extensions. This estimated impact of personal wealth may be conservative, as the analyses are conditional on political party affiliation, which itself could be partially driven by wealth-related concerns.

A potential concern is that the instrument violates the exclusion restriction, which could lead to endogeneity bias in the IV estimates. To address this concern and increase the plausibility of the exclusion restriction, a placebo test is conducted using a set of laws pertaining to broader redistributive preferences, as detailed in Appendix C (Table B.4). The results from this test indicate no relationship between personal wealth and voting on these placebo laws related to redistributive preferences, suggesting it is unlikely that a violation of the exclusion restriction drives the main findings. Furthermore, no reduced-form relationship is observed between the instrument and voting on these placebo laws.

4.3 Interpretation

The results presented above demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between politicians' personal wealth and their voting behavior. The IV estimates attempt to achieve a causal interpretation of this relationship. Assuming a causal interpretation of the estimates, I now explore counterfactual scenarios, investigating what would have occurred if politicians had been wealthier or poorer, while holding all other factors constant, based on the estimates derived from these models.

To interpret the influence of personal wealth on voting propensity, I focus on the aggregate effect of these predicted individual probabilities on the overall acceptance of a law. Specifically, the probability of law acceptance, where N politicians vote, is determined by the likelihood that a majority ($k > \frac{N}{2}$) of politicians vote in favor of the law. This probability is characterized by a Poisson binomial distribution, which is the summation of N Bernoulli

variables, each independently distributed according to the predicted probability ($\hat{p}_i$) for each politician i. The resulting random variable reflects the probability that the majority vote in favor of the law. In Figure 3, I illustrate this probability, representing the likelihood of law acceptance,[21] and plot this against a scaled version of personal wealth $\alpha \cdot W_i$, where α ranges from 1 to 10, while keeping all control variables constant. I specifically focus on fiscal laws, as they exhibit the most notable effects, and employ the coefficients from the IV specification in Model 4 of Table 5 for Panel A. The plot in Figure 3 visualizes the change in the probability of law acceptance when politicians experience an increase in wealth by a factor of α.

[Figure 3]

The findings indicate that the impact of personal wealth on the likelihood of law acceptance is economically significant. Panel A of the figure calculates the acceptance probabilities based on scaled wealth levels for all politicians. In Section 2, I explained that the median Lower House member in 1910 was considerably poorer compared to 1870. Therefore, when $\alpha = 10$, this represents a counterfactual scenario where a member of parliament in 1910 operates under the same constraints as in 1910 but with a wealth level similar to that of a member of parliament in 1870. The results highlight significant differences, particularly in three laws: the introduction of the inheritance tax for lineal descendants in 1878, the introduction of income tax in 1893, and a rate hike on the inheritance tax in 1916.

In Panel B, I present results obtained from an alternative comparable IV model using the natural logarithm of personal wealth as the endogenous variable.[22] Panel B demonstrates a similar pattern to Panel A but with a more pronounced influence of wealth on law acceptance. Notably, the key finding from Panels A and B is that the laws most affected by personal interests are those that pioneered the inheritance tax and income tax. These laws represented significant shifts in paradigm, and it is precisely in these cases that politicians' personal wealth levels would have made a substantial difference. If politicians had been significantly wealthier, these laws may not have been accepted at all. Additionally, Figure 1 indicates that the marginal increase in taxes (and therefore expected costs) was highest for these three laws. Indirectly, this supports the interpretation for the lack of a robust effect in suffrage extension votes, as the expected personal costs for politicians were likely to be low. The effects of personal wealth on the outcome of the 1872 income tax, which was rejected, are also substantial. Calculations under the assumption of *ceteris paribus* politicians, with the exception of reduced wealth, suggest a substantial increase in the probability of law acceptance. Overall, these results demonstrate the economically meaningful impact of personal wealth on voting behavior in fiscal legislation, particularly driven by specific laws that pioneered legislation in this domain.

[21] This is calculated using the distribution implied by the predicted individual probabilities of acceptance, which are a function of personal wealth W_i and control variables.

[22] Specifically Model 4 in Appendix Table B.16.

4.4 Heterogeneity and Robustness Checks

Heterogeneity: In Appendix C, I explore the heterogeneity of the found effects in various ways. Firstly, I have repeatedly pooled all fiscal laws together. In Tables B.7 and B.8, I explore heterogeneity in the effects of personal wealth on fiscal legislation. In particular, I separate the Income Tax from the Inheritance Tax. The analyses on both subsets of laws show very similar coefficient signs and magnitude. As in the aggregate analysis, the coefficients hover around a magnitude of -0.04 and are very similar for both sets of laws.

Next, I focus on heterogeneity with respect to the traditional and new elites, as in Becker and Hornung (2020). Similar to that study, traditional elites were elites who inherited large fortunes in real estate and land, whereas *nouveaux riches* elites had amassed their fortunes in stocks and other investments in the Industrial Revolution. In Table B.9, I show the results of the analysis of Fiscal Legislation in two different subsamples: observations with the Real Estate Share of Total Wealth being above the median (1-2) and below the median (3-4). The results are essentially driven by those observations with a Real Estate Share of Total Wealth above the median, meaning that traditional elites showed sensitivity of their voting behavior with respect to Personal Wealth, whereas the effect seems to be absent for politicians with a smaller Real Estate Share of Wealth.[23]

Finally, I focus on potential heterogeneity between periods. My analysis involves pooling votes over a time span of about 50 years. I explore whether there is a qualitative difference in the relationship between Personal Wealth and voting in two subperiods. As a breaking point, I take the year 1897. This is the year in which the most serious suffrage extension was implemented, and parliament saw a significant change in composition. In Table B.12, I run the analysis of fiscal legislation analysis within subsamples of these two periods. The results show no indication of a differential relationship between Wealth and Voting Behavior in these two periods.

Robustness checks: In the second part of Appendix C, a battery of robustness checks are reported to confirm that these results are not sensitive to alternative specifications and definitions. In Table B.13, I show that the baseline OLS results are invariant to the model used: I estimate logit models, and the results are comparable to the baseline model. Secondly, a key part of the methodology, isolating the influence of personal wealth from the influence of portfolio returns and investment behavior of politicians, encompassed an estimation of a politician's wealth at the time of voting. In Tables B.14 and B.15, I show the results of Fiscal and Suffrage analyses using not estimated wealth at the time vote, but actual (deflated) wealth at the time of death. The results are not sensitive to the procedure,

[23] In Table B.10, I replicate the aforementioned analysis for the Suffrage Extension law projects. In this case, I find no evidence of an effect in any of the groups, nor do I find evidence of a different sensitivity of voting behavior with respect to Personal Wealth between them. As a further test of whether the results are driven by the "old" landed elites, I show again the results of the analysis of Fiscal Legislation conditional on having above/below median "industrial" assets over total wealth, which I take to be both foreign and domestic (Dutch) bonds and shares. The results are reported in Table B.11. These results also confirm that the coefficients are driven by more traditional elites with below median industrial assets over wealth.

and show the same coefficient estimates in the analysis conducted by OLS (models 1-2), and also in IV analyses (models 3-4). In addition, I opted for the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of wealth in the main text. In Table B.16, I employ the natural log in OLS and IV regressions. Again, the results are not at all sensitive to the particular transformation. Next, in the main text, I have employed a classification of political parties into four main factions: Protestant and Catholic politicians, liberals and socialists. I have also explored the robustness of my analysis to a more homogeneous classification of political parties. All the main results are essentially invariant to this classification, which I demonstrate in Tables B.17 and B.18. In most specifications, I have opted for law fixed-effects and party fixed-effects, while not considering law-party fixed-effects. In Tables B.19 (suffrage extensions) and B.20 (fiscal legislation), I show that the main results are invariant to the incorporation of these additional dummies. Furthermore, I also explore the sensitivity of the results to the process of controlling for portfolio shares. In Tables B.2 and B.3, I analyze the results using the deflated wealth measure under yearly portfolio rebalancing using the share at the age of death. The results are also insensitive to this choice. Additionally, I explore the sensitivity of the results to different levels of clustering. In particular, in Tables B.21 and B.22, I cluster the standard errors by family name rather than by individual politician, since voting behavior might be correlated within groups of the same political family. These results are also very similar to the results presented in the main text, and the statistical significance of the variables of interest does not change. In Tables B.23 and B.24, I check whether the results come from one or more parties, which they do not appear to be.

Finally, there are two concerns related to selection that warrant consideration. Firstly, there is apprehension that the unavailability of probate inventories, leading to omitted observations, may introduce a selection bias in the sample. For example, it is possible that the politicians included in the sample are more susceptible to the influence of personal wealth. To address this concern, Table B.1 analyzes the correlates of finding a politician's probate inventory. The results indicate that politicians are essentially missing at random with respect to many observable characteristics, conditional on the law. Importantly, the sample does not exhibit an oversampling of liberal, confessional, or socialist politicians relative to the population. There are only a few reservations in this regard. Firstly, there is a statistically significant but economically negligible tendency to observe younger politicians less frequently. This bias arises due to the limited availability of archival sources, as politicians who died at a later date are more likely to have passed away after 1927, making their probate inventories more difficult to access.[24] In the case of fiscal legislation, the sample is slightly skewed towards politicians with higher voting shares.

Secondly, there is a concern regarding unobservable omitted variables that may be driving the observed effects in these analyses. The R^2 statistics indicate that the party dummies account for approximately 30% to 40% of the variation in voting behavior on suffrage and fiscal laws. In the remaining models, the coefficient remains fairly stable across different

[24]For a similar reason, the suffrage sample also has an underrepresentation of Socialist politicians.

specifications and is robust to the inclusion of control variables. To assess the robustness of the estimated effect and address potential selection bias arising from omitted variables, I employ the method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2019) to account for selection based on unobservable factors. Starting with the unconditional model, I assume a maximum R^2 of 0.75, which is roughly twice the R^2 of the minimal model. I then calculate the strength of selection on unobservable variables (the correlation between wealth and the unobserved variables) relative to the selection on observable variables, such that the estimated coefficient on personal wealth becomes zero. This statistic, referred to as the Selection Ratio is reported in all regression tables.

In both Tables 4 and 5, the Selection Ratios are generally greater than 1, indicating that the correlation between wealth and unobservable variables must be higher than the correlation between observable control variables and wealth in order to explain away the effect attributed to personal wealth on voting behavior. Considering the strong selection on observables, it is unlikely that selection on unobservables is responsible for the estimated coefficient values.

5 Conclusion

Wealthier politicians were less inclined to vote in favor of fiscal legislation compared to their less wealthy counterparts, after controlling for a wide range of variables, including political party alignment. However, when examining suffrage extensions, the correlation between personal wealth and voting behavior was close to zero and often not statistically significant. To make a causal interpretation of the results discussed in Section 4 more plausible, several steps were taken. First, a control-based approach was employed to isolate the effect of wealth from potentially confounding factors. Nevertheless, it is possible that politician-specific effects are correlated with wealth, which could have rendered the results spurious or non-causal.[25]

To further disentangle the influence of personal wealth from other effects that may arise from endogeneity, IV estimation was employed, exploiting variation in wealth that is unlikely to have a direct effect on voting behavior. The results of these analyses demonstrated a significant negative relationship between personal wealth and voting behavior on fiscal legislation. Moreover, the consistency of the results across different models suggests that endogeneity is an unlikely explanation for the findings. To further bolster the robustness of the results, placebo tests were conducted. These tests examined laws that are unlikely to have an impact on a politician's personal finances. The absence of any effect in these tests dispels concerns that the results may have been generated by other latent factors, such as ideology or peer effects, as these factors should also be systematically related to voting behavior on non-fiscal laws.

[25] One possible source of this correlation is interest group rewards for voting behavior (Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009; Fisman et al., 2014).

The results of this study have several implications. Firstly, it suggests that the dominance of wealthy individuals in parliament may have hindered and delayed fiscal expansion during the transition from oligarchy to democracy in the nineteenth century. Subsequently, the decline in wealth of political elites over time has facilitated the transition to a bigger government. While this trend has been noted by economic historians (Piketty et al., 2006), the implications of this phenomenon have not been widely explored in the theoretical political economy literature (cf. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Besley, 2004; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004). These findings add to the literature on the determinants of taxation and specifically highlights the influence of the composition of parliament (cf. Besley and Persson, 2013). Furthermore, the analysis reveals that these trends in parliamentary composition do not have an immediate effect on suffrage extensions in the context of the Netherlands: institutional changes such as suffrage extension do not readily affect politicians' personal finances and are therefore not prone to self-interested behavior. In summary, the findings of this study provide important insights into the relationship between personal wealth and political decision-making. They shed light on the historical obstacles to fiscal expansion and the impact of changing political elites on government size.

This analysis also contributes to the Dutch political history literature by introducing a new factor that may influence politicians' decision-making: personal wealth (Lijphart, 1975; De Rooy, 2014; Turpijn, 2017). This study ultimately reveals that personal wealth is an important but limited factor in politicians' decision-making. The analysis suggests that the Dutch political transition was primarily driven by ideological factors and party alignment, as characterized by political historians.

Finally, I acknowledge the possibility that the limited data availability may skew the results towards politicians with a strong responsiveness to variation in personal wealth. However, there are several reasons to believe that this explanation is unlikely. It is unlikely that the probate inventories of politicians who prioritized personal wealth would be easier to find than those who did not. Empirically, I investigate whether data collection was skewed towards certain politicians and find no meaningful relationship between observable characteristics and being present in the sample. Therefore, the results are unlikely to be significantly affected by data availability bias.

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6 Tables and Figures Main Text

6.1 Tables

Table 1: Variables used in the Analysis

Description	**Source**
Panel A: Dependent and Main Indep. Vars:	
Vote in favor (1) or against (0) a law	Staten Generaal Digitaal
Wealth at the time of voting	Archival Records + Jordà et al. (2019)
Political affiliation	PDC
Panel B: District Characteristics	
Share of Labor Force in Agriculture (Nearest Year)	HDNG
Share of Labor Force in Industry (Nearest Year)	HDNG
Share of Labor Force in Services (Nearest Year)	HDNG
Share of District Paying Income Tax Rev.	HDNG
Share of District Paying Wealth Tax Rev.	HDNG
Total Personal Taxes in District	HDNG
Number of Strikes in district in year $t-1$	IISG
Percentage Roman Catholic in district	HDNG
Percentage Reformed (Hervormd) Protestants in district	HDNG
Percentage Reformed (Gereformeerd) Protestant in district	HDNG
Panel C: Electoral Characteristics	
Vote Share = $\frac{\text{Number of Votes in Election Preceding Vote}}{\text{Total Votes}}$	Repositorium Elections
Dummy Socialist in District	Repositorium Elections
Percentage of Vote by Socialist Candidates	Repositorium Elections
Days Elapsed since Last Election	Repositorium Elections
Turnout = $\frac{\text{No. of Voters}}{\text{Eligible voters}}$	Repositorium Elections
Vote Share Nearest Competitor = $\frac{\text{Number of votes Runner-up}}{\text{No. of Voters}}$	Repositorium Elections
Panel D: Politician Characteristics	
Birth Date	PDC
Start Date	PDC
Death Date	PDC
Date at Voting	Repositorium Elections
Seniority (Time Active in Politics) until Vote	PDC
Panel F: IV-Related Variables	
Time Between Career Exit & Death	PDC
Father Politician	Genealogy sites, Dutch Biographical Dictionary
Inheritance	Archival Records
# Siblings	Genealogy websites

Table 2: Dissent in Voting Behavior in Key Laws

						Party Line			Dissent		
Category	Law	Year	N	Pct. In Favor	Status	Confessional	Liberal	Socialist	Confessional	Liberal	Socialist
Electoral Law	Electoral Law 1872	1874	71	0.45	Rejected	Con	Pro	-	0.04	0.30	-
	Electoral Law 1887	1887	83	0.82	Accepted	Pro	Pro	-	0.39	0.02	-
	Electoral Law 1892	1894	98	0.42	Rejected	Con	Pro	Pro	0.16	0.37	0.00
	Electoral Law 1896	1896	88	0.74	Accepted	Pro	Pro	Pro	0.41	0.17	0.00
	Electoral Law 1918	1919	68	0.85	Accepted	Pro	Pro	Pro	0.30	0.00	0.00
Fiscal Law	Income Tax 1872	1872	78	0.35	Rejected	Con	Pro	-	0.04	0.49	-
	Income Tax 1893	1893	89	0.62	Accepted	Con	Pro	Con	0.26	0.08	0.00
	Income Tax 1914	1914	80	0.85	Accepted	Pro	Pro	Pro	0.34	0.00	0.00
	Inheritance Tax 1878	1878	80	0.60	Accepted	Con	Pro	-	0.04	0.10	-
	Inheritance Tax 1911	1911	69	0.93	Accepted	Pro	Pro	Pro	0.14	0.00	0.00
	Inheritance Tax 1916	1916	77	0.62	Accepted	Con	Pro	Pro	0.15	0.04	0.00
	Inheritance Tax 1921	1921	70	0.77	Accepted	Pro	Con	Pro	0.26	0.17	0.00

Dissent is defined as the percentage of politicians of each faction having voted against the party line.

Party Line is defined as the median vote per party: 'Pro' if in favor, 'Con' if against, 'None' if no discerible party line (equally split), and '-' if N.A.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

	Suffrage Extension				Fiscal Legislation			
	Mean	Median	SD	N	Mean	Median	SD	N
Panel A: Dependent and Main Independent Variables								
Vote	0.65	1.00	0.48	415	0.67	1.00	0.47	548
Wealth (Time Vote)	197.04	67.97	387.25	287	166.36	55.09	342.11	348
Wealth (Time Vote), Rebalanced	222.95	88.63	437.92	287	183.98	80.05	355.87	348
Panel B: Party Affiliation								
Catholic	0.22	0.00	0.42	412	0.21	0.00	0.41	546
Protestant	0.21	0.00	0.41	412	0.23	0.00	0.42	546
Socialist	0.08	0.00	0.26	412	0.12	0.00	0.33	546
Liberal	0.48	0.00	0.50	412	0.43	0.00	0.50	546
Panel C: District Characteristics								
% District in Agriculture	0.18	0.18	0.12	328	0.17	0.18	0.12	458
% District in Industry	0.42	0.43	0.09	328	0.43	0.43	0.09	458
% District in Services	0.40	0.36	0.19	328	0.40	0.36	0.19	458
Share of District Income Tax	59.85	43.62	53.30	339	53.05	37.39	49.43	472
Share of District Wealth Tax	3.43	2.34	3.13	339	3.05	2.08	2.92	472
District Total Personal Tax Income	238.33	100.64	319.17	339	228.70	94.82	313.15	472
No. of Strikes	3.72	1.00	10.80	339	12.78	1.00	37.01	472
% Catholic	0.37	0.30	0.29	339	0.36	0.31	0.28	472
% Hervormd	0.57	0.63	0.26	339	0.55	0.61	0.24	472
% Gereformeerd	0.07	0.05	0.07	339	0.08	0.07	0.08	472
Panel D: Electoral Characteristics								
Vote Share	0.51	0.50	0.26	338	0.55	0.53	0.19	469
Socialist Dummy	0.22	0.00	0.42	338	0.50	0.00	0.50	469
Socialist Vote Share	0.06	0.00	0.16	338	0.16	0.00	0.24	469
Days Since Last Election	706.29	801.00	592.59	338	710.38	637.00	542.69	470
Turnout	0.65	0.67	0.18	338	0.72	0.75	0.16	469
Vote Share Nearest Competitor	0.25	0.25	0.12	316	0.28	0.29	0.12	458
Seniority	3234.71	2305.00	2942.38	415	3589.90	2767.00	3187.51	548
Panel E: Instrumental Variable								
Father Politician	0.34	0.00	0.47	279	0.27	0.00	0.45	346

All wealth numbers deflated to 1900, and displayed in units of 1000 guilders. Wealth at time vote represents the wealth of politician i at the time of voting for a particular law. Socialist dummy indicates whether a socialist participated in the last election of politician i's district. Seniority indicates the days since a politician became an MP. Father politician indicates whether father of politician i was a politician.

Table 4: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Suffrage Extensions

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.007**	-0.008*	-0.010	-0.020
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.028)
% Industry in District		-0.299		0.142
		(0.593)		(0.783)
% Services in District		0.077		0.321
		(0.341)		(0.440)
% Catholic in District		0.464		0.345
		(0.630)		(0.621)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.653		0.521
		(0.705)		(0.725)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.004		0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Seniority		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.217		0.232
		(0.208)		(0.201)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.126		0.148
		(0.098)		(0.095)
Vote Share		0.287		0.248
		(0.176)		(0.192)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.579*		0.444
		(0.299)		(0.330)
Turnout		0.006		0.079
		(0.219)		(0.273)
Days since Last Election		0.061***		0.056***
		(0.018)		(0.018)
N	286	238	272	225
Adj. R^2	0.33	0.35	0.32	0.32
β_{FS}	-	-	2.327***	2.043**
			(0.84)	(0.93)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.022	-0.032
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	13.71	8.93
Selection Ratio	1.69	2.29	1.86	1.50
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table 5: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Fiscal Legislation

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.009**	-0.008*	-0.041**	-0.057**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.025)
% Industry in District		0.085		0.771
		(0.432)		(0.542)
% Services in District		-0.159		0.325
		(0.239)		(0.319)
% Catholic in District		-0.214		0.059
		(0.315)		(0.529)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.301		0.390
		(0.357)		(0.576)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000**		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.001*		-0.001
		(0.001)		(0.002)
Seniority		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.015		0.007
		(0.112)		(0.135)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.031		-0.011
		(0.089)		(0.105)
Vote Share		-0.028		-0.082
		(0.186)		(0.189)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.051		0.253
		(0.217)		(0.314)
Turnout		0.157		-0.024
		(0.208)		(0.293)
Days since Last Election		-0.085*		-0.023
		(0.051)		(0.064)
N	347	301	340	295
Adj. R^2	0.46	0.53	0.34	0.28
β_{FS}	-	-	2.732***	2.415***
			(0.61)	(0.68)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.101**	-0.126**
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	17.16	12.74
Selection Ratio	22.96	13.85	2.87	7.97
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

6.2 Figures



Figure 1: Tax Rates As A Function of Time, Income/Wealth



Figure 2: Wealth Distribution Lower House Over Time



Figure 3: Probability of Acceptance for Various Laws

Online Appendix

A Extensive Historical Background

In this Section, I discuss the broader drivers of change that prompted suffrage extensions and fiscal modernization to feature prominently on the political agenda throughout the era studied in this paper, and I discuss the broader context surrounding these reforms in more detail. Much of the discussion on suffrage extensions draws heavily from De Jong (2001); Jong (2017); Van Der Kolk et al. (2018).

A.1 Suffrage Extensions

Principal differences between factions: One reason why suffrage extensions took so long to be implemented, and the path to universal suffrage took so long, was that various relevant political factions had very different ideas about suffrage. Throughout the period, almost no one in Parliament regarded suffrage as a natural right or human right that should be granted without restrictions to all adult (male) citizens. The prevailing view in the debates was that suffrage was actually a competence granted by the government as a function. This perspective was held even by left-liberal members of Parliament (Jong, 2017). After 1848, the liberals were able to leave their mark on the content and form of politics, and one of the ways in which so was to implement the electoral system of the basis of individualized suffrage with the vision that suffrage should be granted to competent citizens in order to elect better and more appropriate representatives. The alternative to individualized suffrage was so-called organic suffrage, which in the Dutch case amounted to suffrage on the basis of the household (De Jong, 1997). This latter view was espoused as a matter of principle by the Catholic and Protestant (confessional) factions of the political spectrum. Both Protestant and Catholic ideologues were very clear about what they thought the Liberal principle of sovereignty to the people: the most influence Catholic politician, Schaepman (1883), referred to "this doctrine, which denies that God is the ultimate source of all authority, is unacceptable to those who base their political and social theories on a superhuman origin. "All authority comes from God" and "all power comes from the people" are two fundamentally opposing principles." The Protestants were in complete agreement with this point: for early Protestant leader Groen, democracy primarily meant popular sovereignty as understood by the revolutionaries of 1789. He sharply opposed this concept of democracy, which he saw as the principle behind the political ideologies of conservatives, liberals, and radicals alike. In contrast, he championed the anti-revolutionary political theory, which defended the sovereignty of God against revolutionary theories of popular sovereignty. The subsequent Protestant leader and founder of the *Anti-revolutionary party*, had made this principle the foundation of anti-revolutionary political thought. Kuyper consistently reiterated that no single form of government can claim to be universally and eternally correct by divine right.

God can grant power to one ruler or many, making both monarchical and democratic governments legitimate. Therefore, the anti-revolutionary stance demanded obedience to both forms of governance (Van De Giessen, 1948).

However, as will become clear, this did not mean that Protestants and Catholics opposed extension of the franchise. In fact, there were several other reasons motivating them to extend the franchise, as explained in the next section. Finally, the socialists supported universal suffrage as a matter of principle: within the SDB, the Social-Democratic *Bond*, founded in 1879, F. Domela Nieuwenhuis played a significant role. During the inception years, he emphasized the necessity of implementing universal suffrage to avoid a revolution. Through universal suffrage, the state could be taken over and socialism could be introduced. In 1880, Domela Nieuwenhuis wrote that anyone who was a member of the state should be able to vote. "The right to self-government is as natural as the right to self-defense... and those who exclude it deny that right, and also deny popular sovereignty." With this stance he went further than the most progressive members of Parliament at the time (Jong, 2017).

Electoral expedience: Jong (2017) notes that the debate around suffrage extension, and by extent, the first suffrage reform proposals were primarily inspired by electoral gain. From the second half of the 1860s, elections were increasingly competitive, voters were less inclined to vote for individuals and more for the parties to which the candidates belonged. As voters became party loyalists, the parties could locate their supporters and try to expand their base by targeted extension of the suffrage. There were ample cases when the confessional parties, who were only lukewarmly in favor of suffrage extension ideologically, supported extension of the franchise arguably for opportunistic reasons. The first party-politically inspired proposal was by the conservative J. Heemskerk Azn. In 1869, he proposed lowering the census in almost all municipalities to the constitutional minimum. Heemskerk argued that the current suffrage system resembled a plutocracy, implying that wealthy citizens dominated the electoral process. However, it was widely anticipated that conservatives would benefit from lowering the census (Van Den Berg and Vis, 2013; Van Der Kolk et al., 2018). Liberal leader Thorbecke interrupted the discussion with a procedural motion, calling the proposal untimely and unprepared, which was accepted. Almost all liberals voted in favor, while all conservative Protestants, Catholics, and anti-revolutionaries voted against.

In addition, the Liberals, who were ideologically in favor of suffrage extensions, often expressed apprehension in practice. This is best illustrated by the liberal politician W.A. Viruly Verbrugge during a plenary debate. He expressed the fear of clerical domination in the contrast between city and countryside. "Precisely because the intellectual development of voters in the countryside is not as great as that of the majority of residents of large cities, those voters in the countryside are so much easier prey for others and so much more likely to follow the lead of priests, ministers, or any other influential person." (Van Der Kolk et al., 2018).

Threat of revolution: Van Der Kolk et al. (2018) note that in the early years after 1870, members of Parliament occasionally wondered where the push for electoral reform was coming from, as there was no extraparliamentary movement. This changed in 1883 with the

establishment of the *Bond voor Algemeen Stemrecht* (League for Universal Suffrage), which brought together political associations and labor unions. One of these labor movements was the Social Democratic League (SDB), which expected universal suffrage to improve the condition of workers. Various demonstrations were held, notably one in The Hague in 1885, which made a significant impression on the general public and was frequently referenced during parliamentary debates on suffrage. The threat of socialism remained a motive for some to extend the franchise: this is best illustrated using an anecdote around the extension of the franchise to females in 1918: by then, a constitutional amendment had granted women passive suffrage but not active suffrage. However, the word 'male' had been removed from the Constitution, so only an amendment to the Electoral Law was needed to grant women the right to vote. When the first confessional cabinet under universal male suffrage, led by Catholic prime minister Ruys de Beerenbrouck, showed no intention of making that amendment, the liberal democrat H.P. Marchant proposed it in September 1918. The confessional government was initially opposed to this. However, the German revolution of 1918 and the threat of revolution by Dutch socialist politician Troelstra were necessary for a change of heart by the prime minister. On November 13, the Prime Minister declared his support for Marchant's proposal. Thus, there was a broad parliamentary majority for universal women's suffrage (Jong, 2017).

A.2 Fiscal Legislation

In the case of fiscal legislation, I identify three broader drivers for change.

Threat of revolution: The late 19th century in the Netherlands, as well as Europe as a whole (Przeworski, 2009), was marked by significant social and political turbulence, with the threat of revolution being a recurrent concern across the political spectrum (De Jong, 2001; Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004). The pervasive anxiety about socialism and the urgent need for fiscal reform were intertwined themes that necessitated a wide range of responses from Dutch politicians. An apt illustration of the fear of revolution can be found in the writings of the Minister of Interior Affairs, J.H. Geertsema, who expressed his concerns to his son about the political ramifications of the burgeoning labor movement. Geertsema noted that a powerful conservative figure could undoubtedly compel the Dutch liberals to capitulate, leveraging the fear of the "red specter." This sentiment was echoed by Queen Sophie, who confided to a friend her apprehensions about the dangerous tendencies among the working class in the Netherlands, despite the relatively high wages and few factories compared to other countries (Smit, 2002, p. 154, p. 165).

In parliamentary debates, the threat of socialism was also often mentioned explicitly: Minister of the Interior Heemskerk also highlighted the necessity of addressing the social question, acknowledging his previous opposition to income tax but now viewing it as a crucial measure to avert the socialist threat (Smit, 2002, p. 208). By the 1880s, it became evident that political actors from different affiliations paid lip service to the cause of reform. The *Liberale Unie* (LU), for example, advocated for a progressive income tax to dismantle

the privileges associated with income from movable property and distribute the tax burden more equitably. Although the anti-revolutionary and Catholic parties were more moderate, they also recognized the need for tax reform to support societal development and fairness (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004, p. 257).

Inefficiency of Present Tax System: The Dutch tax system in the late 19th century, heavily reliant on excise duties, was widely recognized as inefficient. The inefficiency and inequity of the existing tax system, which was heavily reliant on excise duties and personal taxes, further underscored the urgency for reform. Dominated by taxes on sugar and distilled goods, as well as personal taxes based on property features like the number of windows and doors, he Dutch tax system was both outdated and regressive. These taxes disproportionately impacted the lower-income population and varied significantly across municipalities, thereby hindering trade and economic fairness (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004, p. 177) CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2016). According to Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004) there was a consensus that the outdated system had to be formally abolished to pave the way for the establishment of an income tax. This sentiment was shared by key financial policymakers of the time, including ministers of finance like Van Bosse and the future implementer Pierson, as well as Van der Heim. Notably, Van Bosse had advocated for the simplification and reduction of state expenditures several years before his appointment, highlighting that such fiscal prudence had not been practiced since 1850 (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004, p. 175).

Key pillars of the *status quo* tax system before it was reformed in 1893, influencing the right to vote included ground tax, personal tax, and patent tax. Ground tax was levied on both built and unbuilt properties, while the patent tax was required for practicing a trade or business, mainly affecting middle-class professionals and artisans. Personal tax, on the other hand, was based on household features such as the number of servants, horses, doors, and windows (Parlement.com, n.d.). The patent tax was required to be paid by those holding a patent, which served as proof of their authorization to practice a profession or run a business. Consequently, this tax was primarily paid by middle-class professionals and artisans. Additionally, personal tax was levied based on specific household features such as the number of servants, horses, doors, windows, and heating installations in a residence (Parlement.com, n.d.; De Vrankrijker, 1967). Until the 1860's, municipal taxes also made up a significant share of government revenue. However, the significant variation in local tax rates between municipalities hindered trade and commerce. Additionally, these taxes were highly regressive, disproportionately affecting the lowest income groups who bore the brunt of excise duties. During the 1860s, municipal excise duties were abolished to address these issues(CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2016).

Moes (2012) provides a detailed overview of the various incremental changes made to the three pillars of national taxation in his Appendix I. (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004, p. 258) have a decomposition of government income and expenditures over time.

Decline in colonial revenues: The late 19th century in the Netherlands witnessed a significant decline in colonial revenues, particularly following the abolition of the *Cultu-*

urstelsel. This system, which involved forced crop cultivation and labor in the Dutch East Indies, came under increasing criticism from liberals due to its inhumanity and inefficiency. The literary work "Max Havelaar" by Multatuli played a crucial role in highlighting these issues to broader society. The end of the Cultuurstelsel nearly dried up colonial profits for the state: empirical research by Smits et al. (2000) demonstrates that colonial public revenues stalled after 1870, underscoring the need for new sources of income (Smits et al., 2000, p. 87). Moreover, the financial strain on the Dutch government was exacerbated by increased military expenditures due to expeditions to Atjeh and the response to the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. In this context, the 1872 Income Tax proposal by Minister of Finance W.J.L. Grobbée was defended by citing public opinion, which increasingly supported such a measure as the flow of money from the colonies ceased (Smit, 2002). This economic backdrop paved the way for significant tax reforms in the Netherlands, shifting from reliance on colonial profits to direct taxation to support the nation's finances and accentuating the need for reform.

In Appendix Figure 4, I illustrate empirically several claims here using data from Bos (2006). Firstly, there is a rising trend of government expenditures net of interest payments and defense spending, indicating a rise in public goods expenditure and social spending well-documented in e.g. Lindert (2004). Next, this increase in spending had to be financed, which caused difficulties under the old (pre-1893) tax system. Before 1893, the Dutch government often ran significant deficits and government revenue was also very volatile. After 1893, government revenue started to stabilize, subsequent governments were able to run a table small proficit and thus reduce the high debt-to-GDP ratio, which starts to decrease from around 1893 (marked by the vertical line in the below Panel).

In Section 2.2, I refer to the personal costs of accepting fiscal legislation to politicians. How likely is it that politicians could make such a calculation or even realize such a trade-off? Machielsen (2021), van Cruyningen (2021) and Brusse et al. (2022) analyze the investment behavior of the Dutch political elite in different contexts and time frames. All three papers show that a large part of the political elite were active investors and held diversified portfolios consisting of a large variety of assets. In addition, some wealthy politicians actively engaged in local financial intermediation, take on the role of financial service providers in their region. Even among the least wealthy politicians investment behavior is frequent. For example, the political elite tends to have holdings in the national government debt. This seems to suggest that as a whole, politicians understood concepts like the time value of money, and were in no way financially illiterate. In addition, politicians frequently received draft versions of the law projects they were voting on. These law projects were preceded by long and extensive debates, and MPs have seen these drafts on numerous occasions, so it is reasonable to expect that politicians understood the financial consequences of the laws they were voting on. These drafts included tables with an explicit mapping between yearly income and taxes paid, on the basis of which I have also calculated the data for Figure 1.

B Analytical Framework

To fix ideas about politicians' personal wealth and its influence on voting behavior, I capture the discussion in Section 2.3 using a simple framework. In the literature, politicians' indirect preferences are sometimes represented by a random utility model, which consists of an ideological component representing distributional preferences, a component that reflects self-interest W, and a random component. In this context, the decision to accept a law can influence politicians' indirect utility V in two ways: first, it is costly if they choose a voting outcome far away from their distributional preferences, $p_i^* \in [0,1]$, reflected by the difference between p_i and p_i^*. Second, politicians care about the personal financial consequences of accepting the law. Both considerations might lead them to decide upon accepting the laws according to the following framework, similar to e.g. Snyder Jr (1991); Levitt (1996); Mian et al. (2010); Tahoun and Van Lent (2019):

$$V(p_i, W_i) = -\alpha(p_i - p_i^*)^2 + W_i(p) + \epsilon_i^{p_i} \tag{4}$$

where $p_i \in \{0,1\}$ is the (observed) vote of politician i, and $W_i(p)$ is a function representing the utility cost of the impact of the acceptance of the law, which is dependent on personal wealth. This also recognizes the potential endogeneity between voting behavior and wealth.[26] This framework accommodates ideological considerations, reflected in p_i^*. Empirically, I mainly control for ideology by using party identification, and I use various strategies elaborated on in Sections 3.2 to control for remaining unobserved heterogeneity among politicians.

I distinguish between utility costs to the politician in the case of fiscal legislation, and in the case of suffrage extensions. In the case of fiscal legislation, the utility costs to acceptance are likely increasing in personal wealth, reflecting the fact that the costs to accepting fiscal legislation would increase in one's net worth.[27] The framework implies that as the magnitude of $W_i(1) - W_i(0)$, the effect of acceptance on personal wealth, becomes increasingly negative, the probability of voting for a tax hike decreases. Alternatively, if acceptance of a law does not influence personal wealth (corresponding to $W_i(1) - W_i(0)$ being zero), there would be no relationship between a politician's personal wealth and the probability of voting in favor of a law. This, I argue, is the case of suffrage extension.

[26] If politicians vote independently of other politicians, then $W(p) = W(p_i)$. This means that politicians would factor the cost of a law in their decision as if the acceptance would depend only on their vote. The period between 1848 and the first constitutional reforms in 1887 was highly unpredictable, with every roll call vote marked by uncertainty. Ministers had the option to present parliament with possibilities for introducing amendments, or they could "try their luck" and subject the law to an immediate vote, both of which were frequently chosen (Van Den Berg and Vis, 2013).

[27] Alternatively, it could imply that the marginal value of public goods arising from these taxes is lower in one's net worth.

C Heterogeneity and Robustness Checks

C.1 Effect Heterogeneity

In Tables B.7 and B.8, I explore heterogeneity in the effects of Personal Wealth on fiscal legislation.[28] In particular, I separate the Income Tax from the Inheritance Tax. The analyses on both subsets of laws show very similar coefficient signs and magnitude. As in the aggregate analysis, the coefficients hover around a magnitude of -0.04 and are very similar for both sets of laws. The coefficients also retain their significance, despite the smaller sample size.

[Tables B.7 and B.8]

Next, I focus on heterogeneity with respect to the traditional and "new" elites, as in Becker and Hornung (2020). As in that study, traditional elites were elites that were known to have inherited large fortunes in real estate and land, whereas *nouveaux riches* elites had amassed their fortunes in stocks and other investments in the industrial revolution. Hence, I use portfolio composition data to roughly differentiate between these two different elites. In Table B.9, I show the results of the analysis of Fiscal Legislation in two different subsamples: observations with the Real Estate Share of Total Wealth being above the median (1-3) and below the median (4-6). The results are essentially driven by those observations with a Real Estate Share of Total Wealth above the median, meaning that traditional elites showed sensitivity of their voting behavior with respect to Personal Wealth, whereas the effect seems to be absent for politicians with a smaller Real Estate Share of Wealth.

In Table B.10, I replicate the aforementioned analysis for the Suffrage Extension law projects. In this case, I find no evidence of an effect in any of the groups, nor do I find evidence of a different sensitivity of voting behavior with respect to Personal Wealth between them.

As a further test of whether the results are driven by the "old" landed elites, I show again the results of the analysis of Fiscal Legislation conditional on having above/below median "industrial" assets over total wealth, which I take to be both foreign and domestic (Dutch) bonds and shares. The results are reported in Table B.11. These results also confirm that the coefficients are driven by the traditional elites: the results show significance in the sample of politicians with *below* median industrial assets over wealth, whereas the results for politicians with above median industrial assets over wealth are insignificant. I thus interpret this as traditional elites driving the results.

[Tables B.9, B.10, B.11]

Finally, I focus on potential heterogeneity between periods. My analysis involves pooling votes over a time span of about 50 years. I explore whether there is a qualitative difference

[28] Tables B.5 and B.6 contain reduced form estimates for Tables 4 and 5 respectively.

in the relationship between Personal Wealth and voting in two subperiods. As a breaking point, I take the year 1897. This is the year in which the most serious suffrage extension was implemented, and parliament saw a significant change in composition. In table B.12, I run the fiscal legislation analysis within subsamples of these two periods. I take the results to mean that there is no indication of a differential relationship between Wealth and voting in these two periods.

[Table B.12]

C.2 Alternative Specifications and Definitions

I proceed to show that the results in the previous Section are not particularly sensitive to the modeling strategies employed in this study. To that end, I first show fixed-effect logit regressions, stratified according to law and party (Verbeek, 2008). I estimate models for fiscal legislation in Table B.13. The results show virtually identical estimates to the OLS analyses.

[Table B.13, B.14, B.15, B.16]

Secondly, a key part of the methodology, isolating the influence of personal wealth from the influence of portfolio returns and investment behavior of politicians, encompassed an estimation of a politician's wealth at the time of voting. In Tables B.14 and B.15, I show the results of Fiscal and Suffrage analyses using not estimated wealth at the time vote, but actual (deflated) wealth at the time of death. The results are not sensitive to the procedure, and show the same coefficient estimates in the analysis conducted by OLS (models 1-2), and also in IV analyses (models 3-4). As in Table 5, the addition of control variables make the effect stronger than in the uncontrolled case. Additionally, several control variables are significant: as before, the share of Catholics in a district has a negative influence on the acceptance probability, but surprisingly, a district's wealth is positively correlated with the probability of acceptance by their representative.

Furthermore, throughout the analysis, I have employed the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for wealth. In Panel B in Figure 3, I have already contrasted results from this transformation to results employing a natural logarithm to transform wealth. This goes at the cost of several observations, as inverse hyperbolic sine is defined for negative net wealth, whereas the natural log is not. Nevertheless, I employ the natural log in OLS and IV regressions in Table B.16. Again, the results are not at all sensitive to the particular transformation. The analyses show again a strong negative effect of personal wealth on voting behavior, such that a 1% increase in wealth would cause a 0.1% decrease in the propensity to vote for fiscal laws, all else equal.

Additionally, in the main text, I have employed a classification of political parties into four main factions: Protestant and Catholic politicians, liberals and socialists. I have also explored the robustness of my analysis to a more homogeneous classification of political

parties. In particular, I have merge Protestant and Catholic politicians into confessional politicians. All the results are essentially invariant to this classification, which I demonstrate in Tables B.18 and B.17.

[Table B.18 and B.17]

The tables show a replication of the results in the main text, for the OLS analyses as well as the IV analysis: there is again no discernible effect of personal wealth on voting behavior for suffrage extensions, but the effect of personal wealth on the likelihood of accepting fiscal legislation is again there. The coefficient estimates are also highly similar to the coefficient estimates in the parallel analyses in the main text.

In most specifications, I have opted for law fixed-effects and party fixed-effects, while not considering law-party fixed-effects. In Tables B.19 and B.20, I show that the main results are invariant to the incorporation of these additional dummies. At times, the statistical significance even improves compared to the main results, but the magnitudes are very similar, indicating that party behavior is generally consistent across laws.

[Table B.19 and B.20]

I also explore the sensitivity of the results to the process of controlling for portfolio shares. In particular, in the two tables below, I use the deflated wealth measure under yearly portfolio rebalancing. The results are also insensitive to this choice, although the point estimates in this case are slightly larger.

[Tables B.2 and B.3]

Additionally, I explore the sensitivity to different levels of clustering. In particular, in the next tables, I cluster the standard errors by *Political Family* rather than by individual politician, since voting behavior might be correlated among groups of the same political family. To this end, I use the last name of a politician as a proxy of a political family. These results are also very similar to the results presented in the main text, and the statistical significance of the variables of interest does not change.

[Tables B.22 and B.21]

In the next tables, I check whether the results come from one or more parties. In sum, there is no clear indication that the results come from dissent in one particular party. In the OLS analyses, the Catholic interaction dummy is most significant, whereas in the IV analyses, the Protestant interaction is most significant. However, the evidence is not uniform and not robust across specifications.

[Tables B.23 and B.24]

Finally, I investigate selection into the sample on the basis of observables. In general, there is no evidence that the probability of ending up in the sample depended significantly on any of the observable characteristics, which speaks in favor of random sampling of the probate inventories.

[Table B.1]

C.3 Instrument Validity and Placebo Tests

One of the threats to identification is invalidity of the instrumental variable, which happens if there is a direct causal link between the instrument and the outcome variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010). This exclusion restriction cannot readily be tested, because any significant correlation between the instrument and outcome variable could be interpreted as the effect through the endogenous variable, whereas the absence of correlation merely indicates the instrument is likely weak. The instruments that I use, *Inheritance* and *Father Politician*, could theoretically be endogenous if Inheritance or Father Politician would proxy for another latent factor other than wealth. For example, being a member of a political family instills certain values that are reflected in voting behavior, even after controlling for political party and other confounding factors, distorting the coefficient estimates in the IV regressions.

Secondly, as a placebo test, I analyze voting behavior on a set of laws considering *government regulation*, i.e., government regulating and intervening markets without bringing forth obvious personal costs to politicians. Importantly, these laws are supposed to be object of the specific beliefs by politicians. For example, if descendants of political families are *ceteris paribus* either more statist or more anti-statist, it is likely to be expressed in these particular votes. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that politicians' personal wealth directly influences voting behavior in these laws, as there are no apparent personal costs or benefits to politicians. Hence, any effect of *Political Families* would be a direct *ceteris paribus* effect of political families' beliefs on voting behavior, rather than an indirect effect through wealth. If that is the case, the exclusion restriction would be likely violated.

[Table B.4]

I instrument Personal Wealth by *Father Politician* (Table B.4) and find no evidence of an effect of Personal Wealth on voting behavior on laws concerning broader government intervention. In all analysis, the coefficients on both personal wealth and political family are insignificant, and the point estimates are close to zero. Table B.4 also shows that there is no evidence for a direct effect or a reduced form effect on the voting behavior regarding government intervention. This again confirms that the part of Wealth that is explained by Father Politician, is unlikely to proxy for something else, rendering it more likely that the instrument meets the exclusion restriction.

C.4 Tables and Figures

Table B.1: Selection Equations for Suffrage Extension and Fiscal Legislation

	Suffrage Extension		Fiscal Legislation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Industry in District		0.363		0.100
		(0.621)		(0.569)
% Services in District		0.721**		0.366
		(0.319)		(0.318)
% Catholic in District		-0.146		0.114
		(0.633)		(0.592)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		-0.065		0.314
		(0.691)		(0.663)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.003		0.001
		(0.003)		(0.001)
Seniority		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		-0.092		0.464**
		(0.323)		(0.186)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.057		-0.127
		(0.100)		(0.094)
Vote Share		-0.005		0.492**
		(0.174)		(0.204)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		-0.081		-0.507**
		(0.236)		(0.230)
Turnout		0.076		0.321
		(0.239)		(0.240)
Days since Last Election		0.006		0.021
		(0.020)		(0.068)
Birth Date		-0.008**		-0.008**
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Liberal	-0.001	-0.103	0.043	-0.108
	(0.070)	(0.127)	(0.075)	(0.153)
Protestant	-0.122	-0.225	-0.110	-0.173
	(0.087)	(0.143)	(0.087)	(0.156)
Socialist	-0.173	-0.622**	-0.082	-0.221
	(0.117)	(0.276)	(0.116)	(0.192)
N	408	305	543	444
Adj. R. sq.	0.14	0.06	0.11	0.12
Law Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

The dependent variable is 1 if probate inventory observed, 0 otherwise. The reference party category is Catholic. Robust standard errors are clustered at the politician level.

Table B.2: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Suffrage Extensions

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	0.001	0.003	-0.018	-0.038
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.052)
% Industry in District		-0.489		-0.159
		(0.580)		(0.615)
% Services in District		-0.022		0.114
		(0.335)		(0.350)
% Catholic in District		0.574		0.550
		(0.643)		(0.632)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.811		0.741
		(0.710)		(0.707)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.004		0.003
		(0.003)		(0.004)
Seniority		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.185		0.160
		(0.214)		(0.236)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.135		0.150
		(0.101)		(0.106)
Vote Share		0.280		0.274
		(0.175)		(0.196)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.633**		0.468
		(0.308)		(0.341)
Turnout		-0.042		0.016
		(0.222)		(0.246)
Days since Last Election		0.058***		0.061***
		(0.018)		(0.022)
N	286	238	272	225
Adj. R. sq.	0.32	0.35	0.31	0.32
β_{FS}	-	-	1.319***	1.087***
			(0.25)	(0.27)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.022	-0.032
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	33.63	18.98
Selection Ratio	0.23	0.72	1.87	1.45
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.3: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Fiscal Legislation

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.020**	-0.011	-0.087**	-0.116**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.040)	(0.051)
% Industry in District		0.013		0.380
		(0.436)		(0.541)
% Services in District		-0.201		0.122
		(0.245)		(0.316)
% Catholic in District		-0.219		0.115
		(0.328)		(0.569)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.333		0.701
		(0.372)		(0.633)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000**		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.001*		0.000
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Seniority		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.012		-0.023
		(0.115)		(0.143)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.035		-0.037
		(0.090)		(0.106)
Vote Share		-0.036		-0.146
		(0.188)		(0.197)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.006		-0.075
		(0.215)		(0.242)
Turnout		0.172		0.049
		(0.206)		(0.254)
Days since Last Election		-0.094*		-0.077
		(0.050)		(0.058)
N	347	301	340	295
Adj. R. sq.	0.46	0.53	0.38	0.35
β_{FS}	-	-	1.278***	1.179***
			(0.26)	(0.28)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.101**	-0.126**
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	32.36	20.9
Selection Ratio	172.35	3.61	2.48	5.46
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.4: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Redistribution

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.001	0.004	-0.019	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.028)
% Industry in District		0.228		0.394
		(0.256)		(0.305)
% Services in District		-0.147		-0.115
		(0.175)		(0.197)
% Catholic in District		0.454*		0.438
		(0.244)		(0.406)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.571**		0.568
		(0.283)		(0.445)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000*		0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.000		-0.001
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Seniority		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		-0.008		-0.030
		(0.070)		(0.084)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.048		0.056
		(0.046)		(0.054)
Vote Share		0.048		0.010
		(0.110)		(0.119)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.035		0.031
		(0.122)		(0.150)
Turnout		0.294**		0.252
		(0.142)		(0.168)
Days since Last Election		-0.007		-0.003
		(0.040)		(0.048)
N	566	501	485	436
Adj. R. sq.	0.44	0.42	0.39	0.38
β_{FS}	-	-	1.422***	1.359***
			(0.29)	(0.29)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.022	-0.006
			(0.03)	(0.03)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	51.48	44.12
Selection Ratio	0.36	0.67	1.54	2.59
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as log(1 + Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.5: First Stages and Reduced Forms for Suffrage Extension

	Without Controls		With Controls	
	First Stage	Reduced Form	First Stage	Reduced Form
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Father Politician	2.327***	-0.022	2.043**	-0.032
	(0.835)	(0.046)	(0.932)	(0.054)
% Industry in District			20.168**	-0.283
			(7.996)	(0.629)
% Services in District			11.053***	0.085
			(4.078)	(0.350)
% Catholic in District			-10.187	0.379
			(7.472)	(0.589)
% Hervormd Protestant in District			-13.412	0.606
			(8.545)	(0.665)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax			0.000	-0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax			-0.000	0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District			-0.000	0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
No. Strikes in District			0.006	0.004
			(0.038)	(0.003)
Seniority			0.000	-0.000*
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District			3.375	0.169
			(2.805)	(0.218)
Socialist Candidate in District			-0.438	0.154
			(1.405)	(0.103)
Vote Share			-1.264	0.285
			(2.013)	(0.194)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor			-4.847	0.540*
			(3.322)	(0.316)
Turnout			5.066	-0.052
			(3.503)	(0.225)
Days since Last Election			0.080	0.054***
			(0.170)	(0.018)
N	272	279	225	230
Adj. R^2	0.12	0.32	0.12	0.35
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

The dependent variable in the FS is Personal Wealth. The dependent variable in the Reduced Form is Vote, defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote).

Table B.6: First Stages and Reduced Forms for Fiscal Legislation

	Without Controls		With Controls	
	First Stage	Reduced Form	First Stage	Reduced Form
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Father Politician	2.732***	-0.101**	2.415***	-0.126**
	(0.606)	(0.047)	(0.684)	(0.050)
% Industry in District			12.898**	0.008
			(5.374)	(0.427)
% Services in District			7.557***	-0.122
			(2.581)	(0.236)
% Catholic in District			2.998	-0.248
			(7.691)	(0.408)
% Hervormd Protestant in District			-1.846	0.334
			(8.823)	(0.460)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax			-0.000	0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax			0.000	0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District			-0.000	0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
No. Strikes in District			-0.010	-0.001
			(0.026)	(0.001)
Seniority			0.000	-0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District			1.064	-0.055
			(1.907)	(0.113)
Socialist Candidate in District			0.054	-0.015
			(1.053)	(0.089)
Vote Share			1.627	-0.193
			(1.763)	(0.186)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor			5.173	-0.030
			(3.335)	(0.210)
Turnout			-2.437	0.077
			(3.035)	(0.202)
Days since Last Election			1.523**	-0.107**
			(0.760)	(0.052)
N	340	345	295	299
Adj. R^2	0.09	0.46	0.09	0.54
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

The dependent variable in the FS is Personal Wealth. The dependent variable in the Reduced Form is Vote, defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote).

Table B.7: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Income Taxation

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.008	-0.004	-0.034	-0.059*
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.033)
% Industry in District		-0.284		0.703
		(0.550)		(0.674)
% Services in District		-0.335		0.292
		(0.332)		(0.452)
% Catholic in District		-0.515		-0.430
		(0.507)		(0.631)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.161		-0.047
		(0.568)		(0.722)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000***		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.003***		-0.004*
		(0.001)		(0.002)
Seniority		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		-0.010		-0.007
		(0.193)		(0.223)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.042		0.029
		(0.127)		(0.156)
Vote Share		0.294		0.148
		(0.254)		(0.293)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		-0.237		-0.043
		(0.354)		(0.418)
Turnout		0.437		0.174
		(0.309)		(0.402)
Days since Last Election		-0.122		-0.084
		(0.088)		(0.093)
N	173	159	168	155
Adj. R. sq.	0.45	0.47	0.38	0.22
β_{FS}	-	-	2.576***	2.473***
			(0.51)	(0.62)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.077	-0.131*
			(0.06)	(0.07)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	9.3	9.12
Selection Ratio	4.39	9.13	3.04	18.86
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.8: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Inheritance Taxation

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.010*	-0.013**	-0.047**	-0.066*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.039)
% Industry in District		0.432		0.939
		(0.674)		(0.889)
% Services in District		0.057		0.592
		(0.332)		(0.589)
% Catholic in District		-0.126		0.876
		(0.365)		(0.991)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.094		1.104
		(0.470)		(1.064)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.001		0.003
		(0.001)		(0.003)
Seniority		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		-0.014		0.050
		(0.145)		(0.194)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.117		-0.281
		(0.126)		(0.203)
Vote Share		-0.161		0.066
		(0.236)		(0.348)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.442*		0.871
		(0.233)		(0.572)
Turnout		-0.119		-0.288
		(0.240)		(0.508)
Days since Last Election		-0.046		0.029
		(0.064)		(0.099)
N	174	142	172	140
Adj. R. sq.	0.47	0.60	0.24	0.19
β_{FS}	-	-	2.906***	2.110*
			(0.94)	(1.14)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.126**	-0.130**
			(0.06)	(0.06)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	8	3.21
Selection Ratio	9.72	57.99	3.13	10.39
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.9: Fiscal Legislation: Heterogeneity by Real Estate Share

Sample:	RE Above Median		RE Below Median	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.084**	-0.121**	-0.033	-0.061
	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.126)
% Industry in District		0.184		1.188
		(0.713)		(1.632)
% Services in District		0.041		0.589
		(0.500)		(1.173)
% Catholic in District		1.336		0.382
		(0.878)		(2.404)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		1.839*		0.505
		(0.931)		(1.665)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.002		-0.003
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Seniority		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.077		-0.052
		(0.257)		(0.290)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.110		-0.016
		(0.154)		(0.201)
Vote Share		-0.244		0.003
		(0.272)		(0.375)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		-0.085		0.493
		(0.435)		(1.078)
Turnout		-0.051		-0.021
		(0.384)		(0.822)
Days since Last Election		-0.114		-0.046
		(0.070)		(0.321)
N	166	143	169	147
Adj. R. sq.	0.41	0.26	0.25	-0.05
β_{FS}	1.683***	1.536***	1.625	0.863
	(0.41)	(0.39)	(1.00)	(1.18)
β_{RF}	-0.142**	-0.186***	-0.054	-0.053
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)
First Stage Wald Stat.	19.38	11.39	1.46	0.4
Selection Ratio	640.87	11.39	1.72	4.43
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.10: Suffrage Extensions: Heterogeneity by Real Estate Share

Sample:	RE Above Median		RE Below Median	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.001	-0.047	0.010	0.066
	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.187)
% Industry in District		-0.509		0.306
		(0.999)		(2.510)
% Services in District		-0.149		-0.560
		(0.575)		(3.605)
% Catholic in District		0.903		0.823
		(0.900)		(1.718)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		1.477		0.521
		(0.967)		(2.446)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.007		0.005
		(0.005)		(0.016)
Seniority		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.434		-0.351
		(0.305)		(0.774)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.069		0.405
		(0.149)		(0.296)
Vote Share		0.402		0.505
		(0.355)		(1.039)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.010		0.716
		(0.432)		(0.740)
Turnout		0.153		0.004
		(0.286)		(0.684)
Days since Last Election		0.054**		0.093
		(0.021)		(0.221)
N	134	111	134	110
Adj. R. sq.	0.40	0.41	0.20	-0.43
β_{FS}	1.305***	1.224***	1.141	0.830
	(0.33)	(0.31)	(1.70)	(1.84)
β_{RF}	-0.002	-0.058	0.012	0.055
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)
First Stage Wald Stat.	25.42	17.83	0.79	0.34
Selection Ratio	0.07	7.99	0.25	0.37
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.11: Fiscal Legislation: Heterogeneity by Industrial Share

Sample:	Industrial Above Median		Industrial Below Median	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.077	-0.133	-0.036*	-0.033
	(0.060)	(0.087)	(0.019)	(0.021)
% Industry in District		-0.766		0.960
		(0.833)		(0.875)
% Services in District		-0.129		0.195
		(0.439)		(0.529)
% Catholic in District		0.676		0.033
		(0.848)		(1.189)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		1.194		0.379
		(0.862)		(1.245)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		-0.000		0.000*
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.003		-0.006**
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Seniority		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		-0.243		0.536*
		(0.163)		(0.317)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.064		-0.224
		(0.103)		(0.171)
Vote Share		-0.083		0.144
		(0.213)		(0.404)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.192		0.268
		(0.353)		(0.441)
Turnout		-0.127		-0.166
		(0.431)		(0.445)
Days since Last Election		-0.172**		0.115
		(0.068)		(0.142)
N	168	151	169	141
Adj. R. sq.	0.37	0.15	0.24	0.34
β_{FS}	1.079**	0.834**	4.268***	4.493***
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(1.18)	(1.32)
β_{RF}	-0.083	-0.111**	-0.152**	-0.149*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.09)
First Stage Wald Stat.	5.22	2.71	13.96	14.19
Selection Ratio	42.12	6.84	1.86	2.96
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.12: Fiscal Legislation: Heterogeneity by Time Period

Sample:	After 1897		Before 1897	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.029	-0.053	-0.051*	-0.047
	(0.022)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.035)
% Industry in District		0.685		0.676
		(1.909)		(0.591)
% Services in District		0.595		0.256
		(1.384)		(0.388)
% Catholic in District		1.172		-0.852
		(1.156)		(0.712)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		1.627		-0.538
		(1.412)		(0.855)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.001		0.010
		(0.004)		(0.026)
Seniority		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.047		0.535
		(0.183)		(0.346)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.368		-0.103
		(0.288)		(0.188)
Vote Share		0.395		-0.224
		(0.773)		(0.261)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.596		0.123
		(0.832)		(0.428)
Turnout		0.755		-0.065
		(0.650)		(0.371)
Days since Last Election		-0.022		-0.075
		(0.246)		(0.093)
N	151	121	189	174
Adj. R. sq.	0.19	-0.05	0.42	0.44
β_{FS}	3.621***	2.313	2.345***	2.095***
	(1.34)	(1.91)	(0.50)	(0.51)
β_{RF}	-0.106	-0.123	-0.105*	-0.092
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)
First Stage Wald Stat.	7.33	2.02	13.27	9.9
Selection Ratio	1.14	2.95	6.51	7.47
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.13: Logit Analysis of Suffrage Extension and Fiscal Legislation

	Suffrage		Fiscal	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.038	-0.032	-0.086**	-0.102**
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.045)
% Industry in District		-2.269		2.582
		(3.951)		(4.636)
% Services in District		0.350		-3.475
		(2.186)		(2.495)
% Catholic in District		4.090		-0.765
		(3.923)		(4.538)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		4.854		0.702
		(4.530)		(5.248)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000		0.000*
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.058		-0.013
		(0.059)		(0.016)
Seniority		-0.000**		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		3.153		7.534**
		(2.901)		(3.464)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.747		-1.137
		(0.812)		(0.972)
Vote Share		1.666		-1.585
		(1.428)		(1.572)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		3.538*		0.655
		(1.906)		(2.287)
Turnout		0.349		0.213
		(1.803)		(2.103)
Days since Last Election		0.718		-0.714
		(0.834)		(0.506)
N	286	238	347	301
Nagelkerke R^2	0.01	0.21	0.05	0.24
Party Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Law Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

* p ¡ 0.1, ** p ¡ 0.05, *** p ¡ 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for lower house voting outcomes. The dependent variable, Vote, is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise.

Table B.14: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Suffrage Extensions

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.008***	-0.009**	-0.010	-0.019
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.026)
% Industry in District		-0.282		0.124
		(0.589)		(0.759)
% Services in District		0.096		0.332
		(0.341)		(0.446)
% Catholic in District		0.449		0.343
		(0.628)		(0.626)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.634		0.523
		(0.703)		(0.726)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.004		0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Seniority		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.231		0.253
		(0.207)		(0.206)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.123		0.143
		(0.098)		(0.095)
Vote Share		0.292*		0.254
		(0.175)		(0.191)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.573*		0.445
		(0.298)		(0.328)
Turnout		0.023		0.106
		(0.219)		(0.294)
Days since Last Election		0.061***		0.054***
		(0.018)		(0.017)
N	286	238	272	225
Adj. R. sq.	0.33	0.35	0.32	0.33
β_{FS}	-	-	2.345***	2.153**
			(0.88)	(0.97)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.022	-0.032
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	12.36	8.63
Selection Ratio	1.68	2.30	1.87	1.56
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Death), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.15: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Fiscal Legislation

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.009**	-0.008**	-0.036**	-0.046**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.020)
% Industry in District		0.110		0.780
		(0.431)		(0.523)
% Services in District		-0.159		0.235
		(0.237)		(0.290)
% Catholic in District		-0.223		-0.064
		(0.310)		(0.458)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.290		0.298
		(0.355)		(0.507)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000**		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.001**		-0.002
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Seniority		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.006		-0.039
		(0.112)		(0.145)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.034		-0.027
		(0.089)		(0.099)
Vote Share		-0.022		-0.037
		(0.186)		(0.192)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.046		0.182
		(0.217)		(0.281)
Turnout		0.193		0.215
		(0.206)		(0.273)
Days since Last Election		-0.086*		-0.043
		(0.051)		(0.062)
N	347	301	340	295
Adj. R. sq.	0.46	0.53	0.35	0.34
β_{FS}	-	-	3.097***	2.976***
			(0.72)	(0.79)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.101**	-0.126**
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	19.33	15.66
Selection Ratio	5.48	11.73	2.96	6.30
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Death), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.16: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Fiscal Legislation

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.027***	-0.016*	-0.069**	-0.092**
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.038)
% Industry in District		0.174		0.700
		(0.438)		(0.535)
% Services in District		-0.103		0.297
		(0.241)		(0.306)
% Catholic in District		-0.220		0.100
		(0.321)		(0.511)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.351		0.703
		(0.360)		(0.560)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000**		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.001		0.000
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Seniority		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.048		0.022
		(0.115)		(0.130)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.059		-0.053
		(0.090)		(0.100)
Vote Share		-0.088		-0.207
		(0.187)		(0.186)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.025		-0.019
		(0.227)		(0.242)
Turnout		0.173		0.051
		(0.215)		(0.242)
Days since Last Election		-0.096*		-0.086
		(0.051)		(0.055)
N	325	287	318	281
Adj. R. sq.	0.49	0.55	0.45	0.45
β_{FS}	-	-	1.552***	1.526***
			(0.27)	(0.29)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.101**	-0.126**
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	43.08	32.6
Selection Ratio	7.73	14.92	2.70	6.17
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as log(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.17: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Suffrage Extensions (Simple Party Class.)

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.012	-0.020
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.027)
% Industry in District		-0.290		0.145
		(0.596)		(0.771)
% Services in District		0.060		0.318
		(0.335)		(0.451)
% Catholic in District		0.527		0.359
		(0.625)		(0.644)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.657		0.520
		(0.710)		(0.723)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.004		0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Seniority		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.209		0.230
		(0.207)		(0.202)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.131		0.149
		(0.097)		(0.095)
Vote Share		0.287		0.249
		(0.174)		(0.189)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.570*		0.441
		(0.298)		(0.323)
Turnout		-0.009		0.077
		(0.221)		(0.285)
Days since Last Election		0.059***		0.056***
		(0.018)		(0.020)
N	286	238	272	225
Adj. R. sq.	0.33	0.35	0.32	0.33
β_{FS}	-	-	2.511***	2.100**
			(0.86)	(0.94)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.029	-0.033
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	15.81	9.29
Selection Ratio	1.55	2.17	1.51	1.49
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.18: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Fiscal Legislation (Simple Party Class.)

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.009**	-0.010**	-0.039**	-0.057**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.025)
% Industry in District		0.109		0.773
		(0.436)		(0.534)
% Services in District		-0.244		0.313
		(0.247)		(0.354)
% Catholic in District		0.023		0.089
		(0.311)		(0.518)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.318		0.393
		(0.372)		(0.579)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000**		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.001**		-0.001
		(0.001)		(0.002)
Seniority		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.007		0.006
		(0.110)		(0.134)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.024		-0.010
		(0.091)		(0.103)
Vote Share		-0.029		-0.082
		(0.186)		(0.189)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.058		0.253
		(0.215)		(0.312)
Turnout		0.078		-0.034
		(0.194)		(0.277)
Days since Last Election		-0.066		-0.021
		(0.048)		(0.058)
N	347	301	340	295
Adj. R. sq.	0.46	0.53	0.35	0.29
β_{FS}	-	-	2.831***	2.415***
			(0.60)	(0.67)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.100**	-0.126**
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	18.51	12.46
Selection Ratio	19.99	60.67	2.71	7.96
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.19: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Suffrage Extensions

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.005	-0.003	-0.010	-0.012
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.029)
% Industry in District		-0.482		-0.132
		(0.578)		(0.807)
% Services in District		0.082		0.318
		(0.330)		(0.415)
% Catholic in District		0.315		0.275
		(0.713)		(0.718)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.426		0.436
		(0.829)		(0.849)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000*		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.004		0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Seniority		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.348*		0.353*
		(0.187)		(0.191)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.132		0.151
		(0.093)		(0.098)
Vote Share		0.123		0.046
		(0.169)		(0.186)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.706***		0.636**
		(0.269)		(0.309)
Turnout		-0.059		-0.019
		(0.213)		(0.257)
Days since Last Election		0.042**		0.036
		(0.021)		(0.023)
N	286	238	272	225
Adj. R. sq.	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.42
β_{FS}	-	-	2.301***	1.946**
			(0.85)	(0.93)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.022	-0.016
			(0.04)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	13	7.89
Selection Ratio	5.77	9.59	3.85	3.57
Law x Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.20: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Fiscal Legislation

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.008**	-0.006	-0.035**	-0.053**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.025)
% Industry in District		0.172		0.801
		(0.401)		(0.504)
% Services in District		-0.140		0.298
		(0.230)		(0.293)
% Catholic in District		-0.246		0.187
		(0.307)		(0.543)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.217		0.551
		(0.352)		(0.577)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.001		-0.001
		(0.001)		(0.002)
Seniority		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.214**		0.138
		(0.104)		(0.148)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.057		-0.045
		(0.084)		(0.101)
Vote Share		-0.092		-0.162
		(0.177)		(0.183)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.017		0.252
		(0.224)		(0.330)
Turnout		0.124		-0.140
		(0.218)		(0.312)
Days since Last Election		-0.099*		-0.025
		(0.052)		(0.074)
N	347	301	340	295
Adj. R. sq.	0.56	0.59	0.46	0.36
β_{FS}	-	-	2.997***	2.477***
			(0.64)	(0.71)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.097**	-0.122**
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	18.6	12.58
Selection Ratio	13.16	9.47	3.90	8.73
Law x Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.21: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Suffrage Extensions

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.007**	-0.008*	-0.010	-0.020
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.028)
% Industry in District		-0.299		0.142
		(0.601)		(0.781)
% Services in District		0.077		0.321
		(0.341)		(0.439)
% Catholic in District		0.464		0.345
		(0.633)		(0.623)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.653		0.521
		(0.705)		(0.724)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		0.004		0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Seniority		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.217		0.232
		(0.209)		(0.200)
Socialist Candidate in District		0.126		0.148
		(0.098)		(0.095)
Vote Share		0.287		0.248
		(0.174)		(0.189)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.579*		0.444
		(0.301)		(0.330)
Turnout		0.006		0.079
		(0.220)		(0.275)
Days since Last Election		0.061***		0.056***
		(0.018)		(0.018)
N	286	238	272	225
Adj. R. sq.	0.33	0.35	0.32	0.32
β_{FS}	-	-	2.327***	2.043**
			(0.84)	(0.93)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.022	-0.032
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	13.71	8.93
Selection Ratio	1.69	2.29	1.86	1.50
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the family-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.22: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Fiscal Legislation

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Personal Wealth	-0.009**	-0.008*	-0.041**	-0.057**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.025)
% Industry in District		0.085		0.771
		(0.431)		(0.554)
% Services in District		-0.159		0.325
		(0.239)		(0.324)
% Catholic in District		-0.214		0.059
		(0.316)		(0.527)
% Hervormd Protestant in District		0.301		0.390
		(0.359)		(0.573)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax		-0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District		0.000**		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
No. Strikes in District		-0.001*		-0.001
		(0.001)		(0.002)
Seniority		-0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District		0.015		0.007
		(0.112)		(0.135)
Socialist Candidate in District		-0.031		-0.011
		(0.089)		(0.104)
Vote Share		-0.028		-0.082
		(0.186)		(0.188)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor		0.051		0.253
		(0.217)		(0.314)
Turnout		0.157		-0.024
		(0.208)		(0.292)
Days since Last Election		-0.085*		-0.023
		(0.051)		(0.063)
N	347	301	340	295
Adj. R. sq.	0.46	0.53	0.34	0.28
β_{FS}	-	-	2.732***	2.415***
			(0.61)	(0.70)
β_{RF}	-	-	-0.101**	-0.126**
			(0.05)	(0.05)
First Stage Wald Stat.	-	-	17.16	12.74
Selection Ratio	22.96	13.85	2.87	7.97
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the family-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.23: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Suffrage Extensions

	Protestant	Catholic	Liberal
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Personal Wealth	-0.055	-0.053	0.026
	(0.064)	(0.103)	(0.035)
% Industry in District	-1.576	0.884	0.717
	(2.565)	(4.608)	(1.001)
% Services in District	0.067	1.780	0.527
	(1.175)	(3.271)	(0.461)
% Catholic in District	-0.419	-2.165	-0.608
	(2.202)	(9.205)	(0.953)
% Hervormd Protestant in District	-0.387	-2.498	-0.470
	(2.646)	(11.512)	(1.047)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
No. Strikes in District	-0.165	0.075	0.002
	(0.137)	(0.201)	(0.003)
Seniority	-0.000	0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District	1.878	9.720	0.229
	(1.260)	(10.138)	(0.233)
Socialist Candidate in District	-0.554	-0.740	0.231*
	(0.548)	(1.111)	(0.133)
Vote Share	0.423	0.220	0.101
	(0.833)	(1.133)	(0.301)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor	0.378	0.402	0.772
	(0.816)	(0.876)	(0.519)
Turnout	1.115	0.303	-0.094
	(1.232)	(1.280)	(0.266)
Days since Last Election	0.057	-0.073	-0.029
	(0.055)	(0.264)	(0.180)
N	42	43	139
Adj. R. sq.	0.12	-0.51	0.08
β_{FS}	3.231**	-2.999	2.162***
	(1.36)	(4.50)	(0.65)
β_{RF}	-0.177	0.160	0.063
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.07)
First Stage Wald Stat.	8.74	0.62	13.14
Selection Ratio	5.91	0.58	484.77
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

Table B.24: Estimates of Wealth on the Propensity to Vote for Fiscal Legislation

	Protestant	Catholic	Liberal
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Personal Wealth	-0.068	-0.021	-0.062
	(0.054)	(0.027)	(0.053)
% Industry in District	3.215**	-0.310	0.440
	(1.374)	(1.260)	(0.669)
% Services in District	0.381	-0.546	0.223
	(0.729)	(1.198)	(0.388)
% Catholic in District	0.204	-4.449	0.394
	(3.236)	(3.853)	(0.686)
% Hervormd Protestant in District	0.227	-5.193	0.875
	(3.459)	(4.473)	(0.621)
% Inhabitants Paying Income Tax	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% Inhabitants Paying Wealth Tax	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Total Personal Taxes in District	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
No. Strikes in District	0.000	-0.025*	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.002)
Seniority	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Socialist Vote Share in District	0.890	-0.182	-0.063
	(0.687)	(1.378)	(0.314)
Socialist Candidate in District	0.185	-0.330	-0.024
	(0.226)	(0.232)	(0.200)
Vote Share	0.782	0.632	-0.316
	(0.930)	(0.756)	(0.263)
Vote Share Nearest Competitor	-0.777	-0.311	0.420
	(0.930)	(0.803)	(0.618)
Turnout	1.657	0.900	-0.337
	(1.598)	(0.641)	(0.510)
Days since Last Election	-0.375	-0.198*	-0.058
	(0.326)	(0.113)	(0.132)
N	55	57	161
Adj. R. sq.	-0.18	0.52	-0.35
β_{FS}	4.772*	4.597	1.379***
	(2.68)	(3.66)	(0.47)
β_{RF}	-0.325*	-0.097	-0.072
	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.06)
First Stage Wald Stat.	5.38	3.11	3.42
Selection Ratio	4.17	299.64	0.36
Law FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Vote is defined as 1 if the politician is in favor of the reform, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the politician-level in parentheses. Personal Wealth is defined as ihs(Wealth at Time of Vote), and instrumented by Father's profession. β_{FS} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regression. β_{RF} refers to the coefficient on the instrument in the reduced form regression. Robust standard errors of those coefficients are reported in parentheses.

C.5 Figures



Figure 4: Government Finance in the Netherlands

D Replication Package and Data Appendix

D.1 Replication Package

This paper is accompanied by a replication package which is hosted on a Github repository, accessible through `https://github.com/basm92/vbpwp`, and also available on the Harvard dataverse (`https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NEITBE`). The replication package contains a README file with several instructions pertaining to the steps that need to be undertaken to replicate the findings presented in this paper. It contains the final dataset, under the directory `data/analysis/dataset_final.csv`. Notably, it also contains the code that achieved the data wrangling to arrive at the final dataset used in the paper.

In principle, the replication package contains all files needed to replicate the paper with the exception of two files (also detailed in the README document on Github/Dataverse): the HDNG database and the strikes database. The 2021 version of the HDNG database, available under a persistent identifier here, is used for this paper. In order for the replication package to function, the user needs to place the 'HDNG_v4.txt' file in the '~/data/district' folder, where ~ represents the directory into which the replication package is forked/downloaded. Similarly, the strikes database can be downloaded from the Harvard Dataverse under a persistent identifier here. The file I used is called 'Stakingen Nederland_1372_2019 (1).mdb' and should be placed inside the '~/data/strikes' folder. In the root folder on the replication package repository (and on the Dataverse repository), there is code that accomplishes this ('download_necessary_data.R').

This replication package can serve two purposes: replication of the analysis on the basis of the assembled dataset. This is detailed in the README on the repository. The second purpose is to replicate the data collection and data wrangling process. The remainder of this manual is about this. It is structured in several steps, representing the way to proceed from the primary sources to the data set. In this manual, I describe this process in detail, and in tandem to the data collection process. The code follows the same structure as the text below: each step is saved in a different '.R' file.

Step 1: Make CSV Voting Files: the first step contains the raw transcribed data from Staten-Generaal Digitaal containing the transcripts of parliamentary debates and head vote counts. I have manually entered voting outcomes, separately for each law, in respective .R files. This first file stacks all of these voting outcomes, and implements a common format: each voting outcome is represented by five variables: politician (the name of the politician), vote (1 if yes, 0 if no), law (name of the law subject to a vote), date (date of the vote), house (always "Tweede Kamer", lower house). These voting outcomes are bundled per category (fiscal, suffrage, social), and saved as '{category}.csv' respectively.

By using the 'date' column in the final dataset, the original documents from Staten Generaal Digitaal on the basis of which I have transcribed and entered voting outcomes in .R files can easily be recovered, by searching conditional on the documents coming from a particular date.

Step 2: Matching the votes to the PDC data: This step involves taking the raw descriptions of the voting outcomes to match with the PDC database, which contains (1) an identifier used for further matching, and (2) demographic and party affiliation data for politicians. I proceed to employ a string matching tool based on the Jaccard string distance to match each name in my voting outcome dataset to a list of potential candidate-matches in the PDC dataset. The potential matches are candidates who were members of parliament at the time of the vote. Because the string matching isn't initially perfect, and because of situations of e.g. father/son with the same name being member of parliament, I correct this matching manually, to ensure the correct person is matched with the correct identifier. After matching, I bind all three aforementioned voting categories together and export to 'voting/voting_behavior_b1_nummer.csv'. This file now contains 8 columns: in order, the b1_nummer, the five preceding columns, the last name of the politician in the PDC database, and the category of the law.

Step 3: Retrieving the district: This step involves retrieving the district politician i represented at the time of voting. This is the first thing that can be done using the PDC database. The PDC database contains biographical entries conditional on an identifier, the so-called b1_number. For each observation, I condition the biographical entries on the b1_number, and look for the district that the politician represented. In order to do so, I make use of string detection algorithms that allow me to detect the name of a particular district in a sentence describing this district. I further slightly edit the names of the districts to remove Roman numerals and other miscellaneous entries, with the purpose of matching the district to municipalities the districts cover later on. In addition to the variables defined in the previous step, the exported dataset after this step contains the district politician i represented at time of voting t, making for a total of 9 columns.

Step 4: District-level control variables: In step 4, I make use of the presence of the district, and a district municipality map recovered from the *Repositorium Tweede Kamerverkiezingen* accessible here. In particular, this website features a time-depending mapping of districts to municipalities, an example of which can be found here. I web scrape these tables to retrieve this mapping. Conditional on the time of vote, this allows me to recover the exact municipalities belonged to that district at that point in time. Then, after finding which municipalities belonged to that district, we can query the Historical Dutch Municipalities Database (HDNG), and subsequently aggregate this to the district-level again. From the HDNG database, I recover the following variables at the municipal level: labor force decomposition (% industry, % services, % agriculture), total municipal tax revenue, share of tax-liable individuals in the municipality, proportion of the population (aged 30+) paying income tax, and the proportion of the population (aged 30+) paying a wealth tax. Finally, I am also looking for the religious composition of municipalities. In particular, I look for the three largest religions, the number of *Hervormd*, *Gereformeerd* (the largest Protestant denominations), and Roman Catholic inhabitants, and construct a measure of the number of adherents proportional to the total population.

After this step, the dataset, which is exported as 'vot_beh_b1_district_data.csv', contains

24 columns: in addition to the 9 preceding columns, it contains the district aggregate of the municipal-level no. of workers in industry, services, and agriculture, their proportional equivalents, the total personal taxes aggregated to the district level, the proportion of the population paying inheritance and wealth taxes, and the religious composition (in terms of the three aforementioned religions) in count and proportional forms.

Much of the code in this step is taking care of selecting the correct time and the data availability for various variables: since these variables are very stationary over time, I always opt to select the survey which is closest in time to the time of the vote.

Step 5: Party and demographic variables: This step exploits data from the PDC dataset, containing data about party affiliation and various demographic aspects. In particular, conditional on an identifier (b1_nummer), I can derive a very heterogeneous party classification constructed by experts of Dutch 19th century political history. I use a mapping to convert this very heterogeneous classification to a mapping involving Protestant, Catholic, Liberal, Socialist, and another involving Confessional, Liberal, Socialist. Confessional is a potpourri of Catholic and Protestant politicians, which together formed a coalition against liberalism. In addition to that, querying the PDC database, I retrieve the birth date, start date of a political career, tenure (difference between date of vote and start date), and death date for each politician i. This makes for a total of 30 variables.

Step 6: Electoral control variables: In this step, I again make use of the *Repositorium Tweede Kamerverkiezingen*. Particularly, I retrieve and aggregate to one dataset pages like this, where outcomes of elections are reported. These primary data contain, per unique district-year combination election metadata, consisting of district, date, type of election, electorate size, turnout, amount of valid votes, amount of seats up for election, and the electoral threshold. Secondly, these data contain *candidate-specific* data, in particular: candidate name, recommendation (if any) by a newspaper, amount of votes, and proportional amount of votes. By inspecting the database, I notice that the proportional amount of votes is calculated incorrectly, so I discard it and recalculate it manually if needed.

In this step, I am interested in retrieving the following variables, in addition to the variables already covered: for the latest election in which politician i took part (which is the election that brought them to power), I retrieve the turnout, the vote share, a dummy indicator whether a socialist competitor took part, the percentage of the vote going to socialist candidates, the no. of days since the last election, and the vote share of the nearest competitor. The code in step 6 implements this process, where the most difficult issue is dealing with candidates who ran in various districts simultaneously. Even though this is a very small minority of candidates, I take the effective district on which I base the control variables the district in which they achieved the highest voting share. The result of this step is saved in 'voting_b1_dis_elec.csv', and contains 37 columns. In addition to the previous 30 variables, it now contains new variables (i) name_in_elec_combined, an identifier for the electoral database, (ii-vii) turnout, vote share, socialist share, socialist dummy, days since last election, and vote share of the nearest competitor.

Step 7: Retrieve wealth at time of vote: In this step, I use the hand-collected

Memories van Successie database to retrieve politicians' asset positions at the time of death. The identifier of this database is the b1_nummer, so it is straightforward to match the wealth database to the already existing database in step 6. The majority of the code in this step focuses on implementing the recursive relationship in equation 2. I use the wealth data to provide a decomposition of the asset classes years between the time of vote and the time of death to estimate the wealth at the time of vote rather than the observed wealth at the time of death. To do so, I classify the decomposition of the politician's wealth into two kinds of categories: (i) foreign vs. domestic, and (ii) government bonds, housing, private bonds, and shares. I make use of the rate of return to everything database (Jordà et al., 2019) to look up the return for each of the asset classes using a weighted return for year t for a foreign asset. The weights I employ in the default specifications are: France 20%, Germany 20%, Belgium 10%, USA 10%, Italy 10%, Great Britain 10%, all other countries 2% (so that the total sums up to 100%). Using these default settings, I compute the present wealth using equation 2 in two ways: first, I dynamically vary the share of the portfolio in assets as a function of returns, and secondly, I employ yearly rebalancing of assets. In all cases, I deflate debt with the risk-free rate. Finally, after recursively calculating the wealth at the time of vote, I deflate this using the Dutch CPI, also from Jordà et al. (2019). In the robustness checks, I regularly employ these two methods, and in addition, I employ no wealth correction, and show the results obtained in the paper are essentially invariant to this decision.

Step 8: Add IV variables: In this step, I add the instrumental variables data to the dataset. This involves the net wealth at the time of death bequeathed by a politician's father, mother (if available), divided by the number of siblings, retrieved from publicly accessible genealogy websites such as geni and genealogyonline.com. This data is entered on the based of a b1_nummer, and consequently trivial to match with the already existing data. The dataset contains a new variable, expected_inheritance_rough, meaning the sum of inheritances from the two parents, expected_inheritance, which is the previous sum divided by 1 + the number of siblings, and deflated_eh, which is the expected inheritance deflated to 1900 guilders using the Dutch CPI.

Step 9: Add strikes: In the final step, I add the strikes to the database. This database is very similar to step 4, as I make use of the same mapping between municipalities and districts to count the number of strikes in the past year in a particular district. Particularly, I make use of a few components of the strikes database. In essence, each separate line in the 'DataVerse' table of the strikes database is counted as a strikes. Then, I group by Municipality-year combination to count the number of strikes in municipality j in year t. Additionally, I retrieve the Amsterdam.Code for each municipality, which is the identifier needed to link this with the district municipality-mapping (which also contains Amsterdam.Codes). This allows me to aggregate the municipality-year level strikes to the district-level. The data itself comes from Van der Velden (2016), a dissertation-turned-compendium of all strikes in the Netherlands between roughly 1800-2016 identified principally by means of newspaper and archival resources. It is likely that the coverage of this dataset is very high, potentially exhaustive, as a broad set of newspapers is at the basis. In addition to the information that

I exploit, which is a mere count aggregate of the number of strikes, many other features are available in this dataset, including descriptions of the circumstances leading to strikes, no. of involved workers, involved companies, industry specifics, etc. The final dataset is found in '~/data/analysis/dataset_final.csv'. The file '~/README.md' contains a codebook with the definitions of all variables in the dataset.

D.2 Wealth Data

This study primarily relied on archival sources to collect probate inventories, *Memories van Successie* (MVS), to obtain a reliable measure of politicians' personal wealth (Bos, 1990). Probate inventories have many advantages: they provide a detailed appraisal of a politicians' wealth at the time of decease, and usually, also a detailed inventories consisting of their assets and liabilities, and a separate appraisal of each and every one of them. The completeness of the deceased's wealth had to be declared under oath, and regularly, the tax agency required descendants to file additional declarations of assets that were initially missing. This indicates that a significant amount of time was devoted to ensuring that an individual's full wealth served as the tax base.

On the other hand, the MVS also have several disadvantages. For one, it is possible that despite oversight, individuals are still able to hide assets in various ways. To the extent this happens systematically, this potentially biases the results, possibly introducing measurement error or selection bias, or making the estimates less efficient (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). If tax evasion is easier for wealthier individuals, however, this likely biases the results downward. Secondly, the MVS provide an overview of an individual's assets at only one point in time, at the end of one's life. In view of life-cycle saving theories in finance, individuals might have various motives to systematically change the composition of their wealth, and anticipate bequests as they get older (Dynan et al., 2002). More broadly, the MVS are available only once for each individual, a fact which necessitates the identification strategy as described in the main text.

Below is an example of one particular *Memorie van Successie* (figure 5). The particular example is a digitized version of the document, available at the website of the Utrecht Provincial Archive. The layout of a MVS is standardized. The first page, the front page, contains the last name and first name(s), and the place and date of death (top right). Afterwards, it contains various point relating to the administration, including the day at which the MVS was registered. It also contains references to various other administrative documents.

The second page of a MVS is depicted below (figure 6). The second page notably contains point 11. Point 11 is a resume of the remaining content of a MVS. Particularly, it contains the gross assets (*Baten*), gross liabilities (*Lasten*) and the net wealth (*Saldo*) of an individual at the time of death. Furthermore, point 12 contains the amount of the net wealth which is subject to taxation. Finally, again several metadata regarding several key dates in the administrative process of registering a MVS are given. Then, on the right page, an overview



Figure 5: Front page of a MVS (on the right)

of an individual's assets and liabilities is given. First, the name and death date of the deceased is repeated, after which a recitation of the oath follows. Afterwards, an inventory of assets and liabilities is assembled. Each asset has a short description, followed by a value. These values are added, first for all assets, then for all liabilities, and in the end, net wealth is obtained (not visible on this picture). Finally, on the basis of this net wealth, taxation is assembled. The MVS is closed by again providing several relevant references to other administrative sources, and a signature of the civil servant and the deceased's heirs (not visible on figure 6, but visible on figure 5 on the left).

Although the MVS theoretically cover virtually the entire population, in practice, it is sometimes difficult to find specific individuals. Out of all active politicians who died within the period of archival accessibility, I have managed to find probate inventories for about 70% of them. In my opinion, missing observations occur principally because of two reasons. The law stipulates that individuals must file and register the MVS at the registration office managing the place of death. This principle is widely deviated from. For example, it is often difficult to find probate inventories of individuals who have died outside of the Netherlands, because there is no designated office. In addition, descendants of deceased individuals often do not file their declaration at the place of death, but rather, at the office close to the place



Figure 6: Second and further pages of a MVS

in which they live, or with which they have a special cultural bonding. In this respect, biographical information about individuals to be found can help locate the likely place of the specific MVS.

The second reason why individuals might be difficult to find has to do with archival organization. Oftentimes, individuals' assets are transferred from generation to generation, leading the civil servants administering the probate inventories to use probate inventories from previously deceased parents to investigate the assets of the deceased children. These probate inventories are sometimes not put back, and hence, leaves open a range of possible locations for the parents' probate inventories. In practice, I believe that after having considered the place of death and possibly the place of bonding, it is generally not worth the risk of conducting more search activity for a probate inventory in potentially different archives and places.

D.3 All Other Data

Other variables used in this paper come from various sources. A short overview of these sources and the content follows.

PDC: The biographical archive of the Politiek Documentatiecentrum (Political Docu-

mentation Center) contains extensive data on members of parliament and government officials. It includes both personal information and details on their (personal) parliamentary activities. This digital archive now encompasses individuals who have played a role in national governance since 1796, such as members of parliament, government officials, members of the European Parliament, state councillors, members of the Audit Office, etc. The size, comprehensiveness, quality, independent composition, and timeliness of this archive make it a unique national and international resource. The data is available for scientific research and journalistic publications, subject to certain conditions. The data I use mainly concerns biographical data, as well as data on which districts politicians represented at different points in time. See here for a short introduction to the data source (Dutch).

HDNG: The Historische Database Nederlandse Gemeenten (Historical Database of Dutch Municipalities) is a repository containing many variables on a municipality-level over time. The information relevant to this paper is on professional and religious composition, as well as on taxes. These are in turn derived from various primary sources. The database is available here.

Repositorium: The *Repositorium Tweede Kamerverkiezingen* (Repository Lower House Elections) is used to gather electoral data. The website is available here. This project aims to provide researchers with a comprehensive resource that serves as a reference tool and facilitates the analysis and interpretation of election outcomes. The publication consists of organized data for each electoral district and election, including details such as the type of election, size of the electorate, voter turnout, and the number of votes received by each candidate. Additionally, through newspaper research, an attempt will be made to determine the presumed political affiliation of the candidates.

Strikes Database: Based on Van Der Velden (2009). This database contains an overview of all known strikes in the Netherlands from about 1800 to present day. Each strike is a data point, represented by information about the location, the time, the context, the amount of workers implicated and the amount of working days lost in the strike. For this analysis, I use the location (defined at the municipality-level) to count strikes in the past year in municipalities, and using the district-municipality map, I aggregate this to the district level. The data is available via this link.

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